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Abstract
Family law has traditionally been treated as an exceptional field, a
marginalized and special case in which the usual rules of the legal
canon do not apply. This Article argues that the current challenge to
family-law exceptionalism has been largely one way, to the detriment of
a central concern of family law: the protection of children and of the
parent-child relationship. Family-law scholars have focused primarily on
whether and how to import the tools and insights of other areas of law
into the zone of family relations, while largely overlooking the
possibility that the tools and insights of family law might instead be
exported outward, into the rest of the legal canon. In the process,
family-law scholars have contributed to an already existing blind spot
regarding the extent to which the conditions of child rearing are
affected, often profoundly, by jurisprudence that we do not think of as
involving family relations, but that affects the conditions of children’s
development by affecting their parents or caretakers.
This Article considers how family law’s perspective on children’s
interests might be exported into areas of law that affect children
indirectly. The Article investigates two paradigmatic fields in which
children’s interests may be affected by cases involving their parents:
criminal law and contracts. By using the perspective of family law to
examine the relevance of children’s interests to criminal law and
contracts, the Article shows how taking children’s interests into
account in cases involving their parents can further the internal
consistency and legitimacy of each field. The Article builds upon this
rationale to formulate a model for assessing when and how it is
appropriate for courts to factor children’s interests into their decision
making in cases that involve children only indirectly.
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Introduction
Family law has traditionally been treated as an exceptional field, a
marginalized and special case in which the usual rules of the legal
canon, such as the ordinary operation of contracts, criminal sanctions,
and torts, do not apply. 1 Many family law scholars today are engaged
in challenging this family law exceptionalism. 2 For several years,
scholars have contested the suspension of the usual rules of law within
the specialized zone of family relations. 3 More recently, others have
begun to argue for importing the tools and insights of other legal fields
into family law, for instance by applying fiduciary law, 4 tort law, 5 or
partnership law 6 to problems within family law, or by recognizing the
constructions of the family by seemingly unrelated areas of law such as
criminal law and welfare law. 7
1.

See Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 Stan. L. Rev.
825, 840–41 (2004) (noting the suspension of usual legal rules within the
family domain, in the form of judicial refusal to enforce inter-spousal
contracts for domestic services, differential treatment of marital rape,
and inter-spousal tort immunity).

2.

See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119
Harv. L. Rev. 491 (2005) (contending that the law refuses to
countenance certain types of economic exchange within the family in
order to signal the sanctity of intimate relations, and in the process
exacerbates the deprivations of women and the poor).

3.

See, e.g., Hasday, supra note 1, at 839–42 (arguing that the suspension
of the usual rules of contracts, criminal law, and torts within the family
reflects the persistence of the gendered doctrine of coverture); Katharine
B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 65, 134 (1998) (contending that the selective non-enforcement
of the non-monetary aspect of premarital agreements betokens a refusal
to recognize the value of domestic labor); Dan Markel, Jennifer M.
Collins, and Ethan J. Leib, Privilege or Punish: Criminal
Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties, at xii–xiii (2009)
(criticizing the suspension of the ordinary rules of criminal law within
the family, which the authors characterize as creating either “family ties
benefits” or “family ties burdens”).

4.

See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries,
81 Va. L. Rev. 2401, 2401–02 (1995) (employing the tools of fiduciary
law and agency theory to reconceptualize the parent-child relationship).

5.

See, e.g., Twila L. Perry, No-Fault Divorce and Liability Without Fault:
Can Family Law Learn from Torts?, 52 Ohio St. L.J. 55, 57 (1991)
(applying tort-law analysis to the problem of alimony).

6.

See, e.g., Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A
Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation
Under No-Fault, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 67 (1993) (reconceptualizing
marriage and divorce from the standpoint of business partnership law).

7.

See Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal
Understanding of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 Va. L. Rev. 385 (2008)
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This Article argues that the current challenge to family-law
exceptionalism has been largely one way, to the detriment of a central
concern of family law: the protection of children and of the parentchild relationship. Family law scholars have focused primarily on
whether and how to import the tools and insights of other areas of
law into the zone of family relations, 8 while largely overlooking the
possibility that the tools and insights of family law might instead be
exported outward, into the rest of the legal canon. In the process,
family law scholars have contributed to an already existing blind spot
regarding the extent to which the conditions of child rearing are
affected, often profoundly, by cases that we do not think of as
involving family relations.
While family law attends with care to the ways in which the
situation of parents affects their children’s development and wellbeing, other areas of law either marginalize or ignore entirely the
extent to which what happens to a parent can affect a child as well.
This Article considers how family law’s perspective on children’s
interests might be exported into areas of law that affect children
indirectly by affecting their parents. The Article will consider two
paradigmatic instances of fields in which children’s interests may be
affected by cases involving their parents: criminal law and contracts.
In criminal law, children are affected especially profoundly by
cases involving the incarceration of their parents. How to treat
children’s interests in such situations has long been a puzzle within
criminal law. By considering children’s interests from within the
limited perspective of their own doctrinal field, however, criminal-law
scholars in favor of taking children’s interests into account have
struggled to articulate a convincing theoretical rationale for doing so,
while those opposed have reached the conclusion that children’s
interests are collateral to, or even at odds with, the overarching goals
and premises of criminal law. 9 This Article turns that conclusion on
its head, showing that, when viewed from the perspective of family
(suggesting that family law look to these and other areas of law to
expand its conception of caregiving relationships).
8.

Others argue for including within the family-law canon areas of law that
regulate familial rights and responsibilities but are not traditionally
recognized as family law, such as welfare law, see Hasday, supra note 1,
at 892–98 (“The exclusion of welfare law from the family law canon has
allowed legal authorities to avoid explaining why the law applies very
different rules to govern familial rights and responsibilities in poor
families.”), and immigration law, see Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law
and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625, 1633 (2007)
(demonstrating the ways in which immigration law regulates marriage
and arguing that “conceiving of immigration law as a form of family law
. . . could alter the way we understand both immigration law and family
law”).

9.

See discussion infra Part II.A.3.
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law’s insights about the nature and importance of childhood, taking
children’s interests into account can be seen as furthering and
enhancing the goals and legitimacy of criminal law.
In contract law, by contrast, scholars are often blind entirely to
the ways in which children are affected by cases involving their
parents. Currently, contracts scholars consider children’s interests
only in cases involving contracts that regulate the family directly. 10
These agreements, such as surrogacy and adoption contracts, are
typically excised altogether from the realm of contract law and
relegated to the specialized region of family-law exceptionalism, in
which the ordinary rules of contract law do not apply. On the other
hand, there is almost no discussion by contracts scholars regarding
the ways in which children are affected by non-familial contracts
involving their parents, such as ordinary commercial contracts or
consumer agreements. This Article uses the perspective of family law
to consider whether children’s interests should be taken into account
in such cases.
By using the perspective of family law to examine the relevance of
children’s interests across the legal canon, this Article shows how
taking children’s interests into account in cases involving their
parents can be seen as furthering the internal consistency of criminal
and contract law, as well as promoting certain goals and premises
that are shared across a range of doctrinal fields. The Article builds
upon this rationale to formulate a model for assessing when and how
it is appropriate for courts to factor children’s interests into their
decision making in cases that involve children only indirectly.
The Article begins, in Part I, by investigating what family law
assumes about why children’s interests matter. It does so by analyzing
the one area of law in which children’s interests are paramount: child
custody disputes. In assessing children’s interests in the context of
custody disputes, courts articulate the myriad ways in which the
conditions of child development form the adult self. This articulation
brings to light, as most legal discussions do not, the extent to which
unchosen conditions of child development—such as parenting,
education, and socioeconomic status—can either expand or
circumscribe the choices available to each adult. Part I ends by
drawing out the insights of courts deciding custody disputes about the
connection between the conditions of child development, on the one
hand, and the extent to which each child is likely to function as a
productive and autonomous adult, on the other.
Part II employs family law’s insights about the importance of
child development to examine how children are affected in cases
involving their parents in two doctrinal areas: criminal law and
contract law. Focusing on two exemplary situations—the
10.

See discussion infra Part II.B.3.

297

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 2·2012
Beyond Family Law

incarceration of parents under criminal law and the enforcement
under contract law of agreements to which the parents of minor
children are parties—Part II uses the insights about child
development articulated by family law to show the extent to which
children’s development is potentially affected by legal cases involving
their parents in both fields. Part II then describes the current
treatment of children’s interests in cases involving their parents in
criminal law and contract law, and the scholarly debate within each
field about whether children’s interests should be taken into account.
Part II ends by showing the limits of, and gaps within, the current
scholarly debate about children’s interests in both doctrinal areas.
In Part III, the Article develops a new rationale for taking
children’s interests into account across the legal canon, even in cases
where children are affected only indirectly. Much recent scholarship
on children’s interests argues that these should be taken into account
to promote deliberative democracy; the argument is that facilitating
children’s development is a necessary precondition of social
citizenship. 11 Another argument for facilitating optimal conditions of
child development is that this is necessary to compensate caretakers
for their unrecognized contribution to the social good. 12 This Article
contributes a new perspective to the debate by grounding the
argument for attending to children’s interests in the underlying
assumptions within and across the various doctrinal areas in which
children are affected by cases that involve them indirectly.
The central such assumption is a model of the legal subject that is
taken for granted by a number of legal fields, including criminal law
and contract law. As Part III demonstrates, both criminal law and
contract law, when discussing the actions of competent adults, assume
a legal subject who is autonomous in the sense of both free and
rational, and as such can be held responsible for his or her actions and
decisions. Part III then shows how the insights of family law
contradict this model. When family-law courts discuss which custodial
outcome is in a child’s best interests, they acknowledge the extent to
which each adult is formed by his or her childhood experience. They
11.

See, e.g., Linda C. McClain, The Place of Families: Fostering
Capacity, Equality, And Responsibility 85 (2006) (noting “[t]hat
society counts on families” to prepare children to “take their place as
capable, responsible, self-governing members of society”); Anne C.
Dailey, Developing Citizens, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 431, 433 (2006) (“The
implications of developmental research for constitutional law are simply
stated: When sufficiently responsive to a young child’s needs, early
caregiving relationships help to cultivate the cognitive and emotional
processes that are the foundation for adult citizenship.”).

12.

See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Autonomy Myth 44–48
(2004) (arguing that society owes a collective debt to caretakers and
therefore needs to support and facilitate their “society-preserving
labor”).

298

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 2·2012
Beyond Family Law

acknowledge, moreover, that a relatively deficient or optimal
upbringing can either limit or enhance the rational capacity of, and
the range of free choices available to, the adult that each child
becomes. Family law thus brings into question the assumptions about
individual autonomy that, as Part III demonstrates, underlie a
number of doctrinal fields that deal with the actions of adults, such as
criminal law and contract law. Part III concludes that taking
children’s interests into account in cases involving their parents can
be seen as enhancing the consistency and legitimacy of these doctrinal
fields.
Part IV builds upon this rationale to formulate a model for assessing
when and how it is appropriate for courts to take children’s interests into
account in cases involving their parents. It develops this model by
investigating how we can best promote the goals and premises of each
doctrinal area of law, such as the model of individual autonomy shared
by criminal law and contract law, while at the same time balancing the
policy needs of each field.
The model developed in Part IV does not call for taking children’s
interests into account in every instance where they are potentially at
stake, or for making children’s interests the primary consideration.
Part IV concludes that we should take children’s interests into
account in cases involving state action against parents, such as
criminal prosecution. Children’s interests in these cases should not
trump every other consideration, as they do in family law. But when
the state acts to reshape the family in ways that adversely affect a
child’s development, it should consider the likely effect on the child’s
future capacities as an adult and should balance this against the
competing policy concerns specific to the relevant doctrinal field, such
as, in criminal law, deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation.
Part IV also contends, however, that courts should not take
children’s interests into account in instances of private litigation, such
as contract disputes, unless that litigation concerns a scenario that is
likely to affect children in a systemic way. When courts and
legislatures encounter a type of private litigation that repeatedly
affects children, they should fashion rules that protect children but
apply regardless of whether children are involved in a particular case.
These across-the-board rules would promote children’s interests
without incurring the risks of unfairness, inefficiency, and parental
disempowerment that would occur if children’s interests were taken
into account in private litigation on a case-by-case basis.

I.

Best-Interests Exceptionalism and Family Law’s
Insights on Child Development

Judicial concern with how children develop into their adult selves is
largely limited to one of the most anomalous areas of the legal canon:
family law’s “best interests of the child” analysis. As this Part will
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discuss in Section A, courts rarely apply the best-interests test. When
they do, however, they embark on a legal analysis that makes children’s
interests paramount. The result, as this Part will discuss in Section B,
is to provide an unusually robust perspective on how children develop,
one that recognizes—to an extent unmatched elsewhere in legal
analysis—the connection between children’s upbringing and early
experience and the type of adult that each child becomes.
A.

Bests-Interests Exceptionalism

Family law’s “best interests of the child” analysis is exceptional in
both applicability and scope. Only in certain carefully delineated
instances do courts apply the best-interests standard. Once applied,
however, the best-interests analysis is exceptionally broad, and
employs a methodology both substantively and procedurally distinct
from most modes of legal analysis and decision making. This Section
will discuss the most salient aspects of best-interests exceptionalism—
when the standard is used and how it works. It will then discuss the
rationale behind this exceptional legal standard.
1.

Limited Applicability of the Best-Interests Analysis

The “best interests of the child” analysis is typically triggered
whenever two or more adults, each with equal rights to a child, ask a
court to resolve a dispute about the child’s upbringing or custody. 13 In
its most familiar form, this type of dispute occurs when the parents of
a child divorce or separate. Every state in the United States, as well
as most foreign jurisdictions, resolves such disputes with reference to
the best-interests standard. 14
After the initial allocation of custody, the best-interests analysis
can be triggered again in the course of subsequent disagreements.
Parents may ask the court to revisit the original custody award 15 or
they may ask the court to resolve differences regarding various
aspects of a child’s upbringing, ranging from the details of a child’s

13.

See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Child Custody in the Age of
Children’s Rights: The Search for a Just and Workable Standard, 33
Fam L.Q. 815, 815–16 (1999).

14.

See generally id. (describing the dominance of the best-interests
approach in custody decision making); see also Naomi R. Cahn,
Reframing Child Custody Decisionmaking, 58 Ohio St. L.J. 1, 5 (1997)
(“Today, when married or unmarried parents separate, both parents
have equal rights to custody under a best interest of the child
standard . . . .”).

15.

See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(a) (2011) (“Either parent may
petition to enforce or modify any court order regarding custody and
visitation.”).
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education 16 or medical care 17 to a parent’s right to relocate. 18 In these
situations, the triggering of the best-interests analysis is not
automatic. When a parent requests a change in custody, most
jurisdictions require that an initial burden—such as a showing of a
material change of circumstances—be met before a court will revisit
its initial decision by re-engaging in a full-fledged best-interests
analysis. 19 Courts are even more averse to resolving differences over
the details of a child’s upbringing, and will often avoid the need to do
so by dividing up decision-making authority over various aspects of
the child’s life. 20 In a number of jurisdictions, however, courts will, in
some circumstances, resolve such disputes with reference to a child’s
best interests. 21
The “best interests of the child” analysis is also used in
proceedings for termination of parental rights or adoptive placements.
16.

See, e.g., Lombardo v. Lombardo, 507 N.W.2d 788, 792 (Mich. Ct. App.
1993) (remanding to the trial court for determination of which school
placement was in the child’s best interests, where divorced parents
disagreed).

17.

See, e.g., Harder v. Anderson, Arnold, Dickey, Jensen, Gullickson and
Sanger, L.L.P., 764 N.W.2d 534, 538 (Iowa 2009) (“When joint legal
custodians have a genuine disagreement concerning a course of
treatment affecting a child’s medical care, the court must step in as an
objective arbiter, and decide the dispute by considering what is in the
best interest of the child.”).

18.

See, e.g., N.D. Cent. Code § 14-09-07(1) (2009) (“A parent with
primary residential responsibility for a child may not change the
primary residence of the child to another state except upon order of the
court or with the consent of the other parent, if the other parent has
been given parenting time by the decree.”).

19.

See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(c) (2011) (“A court having
jurisdiction may modify an order concerning the care, custody and
visitation of the children if there is a showing by either parent of a
material change in circumstances since the entry of the order in question
and that the modification would be in the best interests of the
children . . . .”); see also, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 767.451(1) (2010)
(requiring a showing of harm to modify a custody order within two
years and a finding of a substantial change of circumstances and that
modification is in the best interests of the child to modify the order after
two years have passed).

20.

See, e.g., Brzozowski v. Brzozowski, 625 A.2d 597, 600 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1993) (giving residential parent the right to make decisions
regarding nonemergency medical care in the event of disagreement with
the nonresidential parent, absent a clear showing that a given decision
would be contrary to the child’s interests).

21.

See, e.g., Jordan v. Rea, 212 P.3d 919, 928–29 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009)
(directing the trial court to consider the child’s best interests in
determining school placement where divorced parents disagreed, and
collecting cases from other jurisdictions taking the same approach).
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Here, a high initial bar must be met before a court can assess a child’s
best interests. In order to terminate parental rights in the absence of
consent, a court must first establish an independent ground for doing
so, typically some form of abuse, abandonment, or neglect. 22 Once the
court finds a sufficient basis for terminating parental rights, it engages
in the best-interests analysis to assess whether termination is in the
child’s interests. 23 Where an adoptive placement is at issue, the court
typically must first terminate parental rights, on the basis of both
grounds for termination and a best-interests assessment, and then
determine whether the placement is in the child’s interests. 24
On the other hand, children’s interests are never assessed or
second-guessed in an intact family that shows no evidence of
endangering its children. Nor are they assessed in the initial allocation
of parental rights. A few scholars have proposed that courts consider
children’s interests in determining who has the right to parent a
newborn child. In the early 1980s, ethical philosopher Hugh LaFollette
made the provocative suggestion that states institute a licensing
requirement for becoming a parent, arguing that the state has an

22.

See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 (2011) (outlining various grounds
for terminating parental rights).

23.

See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292 (Supp. I 2010) (providing for
termination of parental rights where court both finds a ground for
termination and determines such termination to be in the child’s best
interests).

24.

See 1 Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Adoption Law and Practice
§ 4.04(1) (2009); see also, e.g., Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 162.016(a)
(“If a petition requesting termination has been joined with a petition
requesting adoption, the court . . . must make separate findings that the
termination is in the best interest of the child and that the adoption is
in the best interest of the child.”).
A number of jurisdictions have special rules that apply to stepparent
adoptions. Where a stepparent petitions to adopt the child of a spouse
who has custody of the child, the nonresidential parent may lose the
right to consent to the adoption, and thus face unwanted termination of
his or her parental rights, by having failed to communicate with the
child or to pay support for a certain period of time. See, e.g., La. Child
Code Ann. art. 1245 (Supp. 2012) (dispensing with consent
requirement for stepparent adoption where the nonresidential parent
fails without just cause to communicate with the child or to pay support
for at least six months). In that event, the court will order an adoption,
and terminate parental rights accordingly, if it finds that to do so is in
the child’s best interests. See, e.g., La. Child Code Ann. art. 1255
(2004) (providing for a rebuttable presumption that adoption is in the
child’s best interests where the court has granted custody to the parent
married to the stepparent petitioner); In re Leitch, 732 So. 2d 632, 635
(La. Ct. App. 1999) (taking into consideration the effect on the child of
severing ties with the nonresidential parent).
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obligation to ensure that each child has an optimal upbringing. 25
James Dwyer has recently made a modified version of this argument,
proposing that the state deny parental rights at the outset to those
who seem particularly likely to become unfit parents. 26 The broad
consensus, however, is that we must have clear default rules allocating
initial parental rights, with the possibility of subsequently removing
children from parents who have demonstrated unfitness in the form of
abuse or neglect.
The best-interests analysis, then, is used only in certain limited
circumstances. Parents either must invite the court to interfere in
their parenting by virtue of their disagreement with one another or
they must have harmed, abandoned, or endangered their child in a
significant way. The law assigns initial parental rights without any
assessment of children’s interests, and, absent evidence of harm,
allows parents to raise their children as they see fit. In the majority of
families, children develop into adulthood without any judicial
assessment of their interests.
2.

Broad Scope and Methodology of the Best-Interests Analysis

While limited in applicability, the best-interests analysis, once
triggered, is exceptionally far ranging. Judges engaged in a bestinterests assessment can consider any aspect of a child’s life, and they
take a much more active role in truth seeking than is typical for a
judge in the American legal system. 27 From its inception in the
nineteenth century, the best-interests inquiry has been, in the words of
one court, more of an “inquest” than a civil trial. 28 The court can order
a psychological evaluation, 29 and can also appoint a guardian ad litem

25.

Hugh LaFollette, Licensing Parents, 9 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 182, 182
(1980).

26.

See James G. Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense: States’ Continued
Consignment of Newborn Babies to Unfit Parents, 93 Minn. L. Rev.
407, 409 (2008).

27.

See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.425(1) (2011) (“[T]he court may cause
an investigation to be made as to the character, family relations, past
conduct, earning ability and financial worth of the parties for the
purpose of protecting the children’s future interest.”).

28.

See Gishwiler v. Dodez, 4 Ohio St. 615, 619 (1855) (describing custody
inquiry as “a proceeding partaking more of the character of an inquest
than of a trial”).

29.

See, e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.425(2) (“The court, on its own motion
or on the motion of a party, may order an independent physical,
psychological, psychiatric or mental health examination of a party or
the children and may require any party and the children to be
interviewed, evaluated and tested by an expert or panel of experts.”).
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who will make an independent assessment of the child’s interests. 30
Judges making custody determinations also frequently interview
children in camera, to learn the children’s preferences as well as to get a
sense of the children’s relationships with their parents. 31
In addition to being atypical procedurally, family law’s bestinterests assessment is unusually open ended. One of the frequent
criticisms of the best-interests standard is the great amount of
discretion it affords judges to determine how and by whom children
are raised. 32 Courts and legislatures have, for over a century, tried to
cabin judicial discretion in child-custody decision making by imposing
various preferences. 33 The nineteenth century saw a shift from a
preference for fathers to one for mothers, particularly in cases
involving children “of tender years”; 34 by the 1980s, the maternal
preference had been largely abandoned, and gave way, in some
jurisdictions, to a preference for the primary caretaker, 35 which in
turn was subsequently rejected in favor of the open-ended bestinterests standard that prevails today. 36 A few jurisdictions today
prefer joint custody, 37 and West Virginia presumes that custody
30.

See Barbara Ann Atwood, Representing Children, 19 J. Am. Acad.
Matrimonial Law. 183, 192 (2005) (“[I]n the context of custody
disputes . . . most states grant full discretion to courts in deciding
whether to appoint a representative for the child.”).

31.

See Barbara A. Atwood, The Child’s Voice in Custody Litigation: An
Empirical Survey and Suggestions for Reform, 45 Ariz. L. Rev. 629,
638 (2003) (noting that a majority of judges surveyed “agreed that
judges can acquire a better understanding of the child and the parties
through an in camera interview”).

32.

See Linda D. Elrod & Milfred D. Dale, Paradigm Shifts and Pendulum
Swings in Child Custody: The Interests of Children in the Balance, 42
Fam. L.Q. 381, 397 (2008) (“The outcomes of child custody disputes
remain difficult to predict and may rely on the judge’s ‘gut’ feeling tied
to a factor.”).

33.

See id. at 393 (“The last forty years have seen various attempts to reign
[sic] in judicial discretion with new presumptions, preferences, and lists
of factors.”).

34.

See Mason, From Father’s Property to Children’s Rights 50–87
(1994).

35.

See id. at 121–33.

36.

See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition of Gender Difference
in the Law: Revaluing the Caretaker Role, 31 Harv. J.L. & Gender 1,
48–49 (2008) (noting that “in practice, even in the few states that have
established or considered the presumption, the primary caretaker
presumption has all but disappeared in favor of a more discretionary
best interest standard”).

37.

See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 61.13(2)(c)(2) (West Supp. 2012) (“The
court shall order that the parental responsibility for a minor child be
shared by both parents unless the court finds that shared parental
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should be awarded by approximating the amount of time that each
parent spent in caring for the child prior to separation. 38 Typically,
however, judges have the freedom to consider a number of factors in
assessing children’s interests, including the child’s attachments to
each parent, 39 the child’s need for continuity, 40 each parent’s moral
fitness, 41 and the ability and willingness of each parent to foster a
positive relationship with the other parent 42—a list that, when
provided for by statute, typically ends with a catch-all clause allowing
courts to consider any other factor that has bearing on a child’s wellbeing. 43
Finally, the court’s finding of a child’s best interests is exceptional
in that it trumps a number of other significant interests, including the
needs and rights of the parents. 44 From the earliest custody disputes,
courts have held that once the best-interests assessment is
responsibility would be detrimental to the child.”); see also Elrod &
Dale, supra note 32, at 397 (“Joint legal custody, which allows both
parents to retain decision-making authority, solved the ‘winners and
losers’ problem for judges.”).
38.

See W. Va. Code Ann. § 48-9-206(a) (LexisNexis 2009) (“Unless
otherwise resolved by agreement of the parents . . . or unless manifestly
harmful to the child, the court shall allocate custodial responsibility so
that the proportion of custodial time the child spends with each parent
approximates the proportion of time each parent spent performing
caretaking functions for the child prior to the parents’
separation . . . .”).

39.

See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 722.23(a) (2012) (directing custody
court assessing best interests of the child to consider “[t]he love,
affection, and other emotional ties existing between the parties involved
and the child”).

40.

See, e.g., § 722.23(d) (directing court to consider “[t]he length of time
the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment, and the
desirability of maintaining continuity”).

41.

See, e.g., § 722.23(f) (directing court to consider “[t]he moral fitness of
the parties involved”).

42.

See, e.g., § 722.23(j) (directing court to consider “[t]he willingness and
ability of each of the parties to facilitate and encourage a close and
continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other
parent or the child and the parents”).

43.

See, e.g., § 722.23(l ) (directing court to take into account “any other
factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child
custody dispute”).

44.

See, e.g., Kuntz v. Allen, 48 Pa. D. & C.3d 105, 108 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl.
1987) (“The paramount concern of the court in any case involving the
custody or visitation of children is the welfare and best interest of the
child. All other considerations, including the rights of parents, are
secondary and subordinate to a child’s physical, intellectual, moral,
spiritual and emotional well-being.” (citations omitted)).
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undertaken, a court awarding custody will not consider how a parent
stands to be affected by the outcome 45 unless the parent’s well-being
itself has bearing on the child’s interests. 46
Among the parental interests routinely trumped by the bestinterests-of-the-child standard are a number of constitutional rights
that our legal system typically fiercely protects. Thus, parents’ First
Amendment rights are frequently outweighed by a custody court’s
determination of a child’s interests. 47 Courts allocating custody can,
and often do, consider a parent’s religious practices and other beliefs
or forms of expression. 48 Where a custody court finds a child
endangered by a parent’s speech or religious practices, it can even
impose a gag order on parents, or require them to engage in or refrain
from engaging in certain religious practices with their children—an
incursion into freedom of speech and of religion rarely countenanced
in our legal system. 49
A child’s best interests also routinely trump a parent’s right to
travel; parents can be, and frequently are, prevented from retaining
custody of their children if they decide to relocate. 50 Parents’ right to
privacy is similarly minimal in the face of a court’s best-interests
assessment; in a number of jurisdictions, for instance, courts can order
45.

See, e.g., Wilkerson v. McGinn, 188 P. 472, 473 (Wash. 1920) (“[T]he
welfare of the children, and not the wishes of the parents, should govern
the court in matters of this kind . . . .”); Corrie v. Corrie, 4 N.W. 213,
214 (Mich. 1880) (“In contests of this kind the opinion is now nearly
universal that neither of the parties has any rights that can be allowed
to seriously militate against the welfare of the child. The paramount
consideration is what is really demanded by its best interests.”).

46.

See, e.g., Ireland v. Ireland, 717 A.2d 676, 681 (Conn. 1998) (noting, in
the context of a custodial parent’s request to relocate, that “the child’s
interests can become so intricately interwoven with the well-being of the
new family unit [created by divorce] that the determination of the
child’s best interest requires that the interests of the custodial parent be
taken into account” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

47.

See Eugene Volokh, Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody Speech
Restrictions, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 631 (2006) (critiquing extent to which
custody decisions interfere with parents’ freedom of speech and of
religion).

48.

See Jennifer Ann Drobac, Note, For the Sake of the Children: Court
Consideration of Religion in Child Custody Cases, 50 Stan. L. Rev.
1609, 1631–40 (1998) (finding that while some jurisdictions require
actual or possible harm to the child before taking a parent’s religious
practice into account in awarding custody, others permit consideration
of religion even in the absence of possible harm).

49.

See Volokh, supra note 47, at 631 (collecting cases).

50.

See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 722.31 (2012) (restricting custodial
parent from moving over 100 miles from initial residence without
judicial approval).
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that parents not have an overnight romantic visitor while their child
is in the house. 51 The only constitutional provision that has been
found to trump a child’s best interests in the custody context is the
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of race under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which the Supreme
Court held prevented a custody court from taking into account the
stigma a child would suffer from living in an interracial household. 52
Even here, however, lower courts have often allowed the consideration
of race when awarding custody, as long as the award is not based on
overt racial prejudice. 53 Children’s interests are considered sufficiently
powerful to justify incursions into constitutionally protected domains
that would be forbidden elsewhere in the legal canon.
3.
a.

Rationales for Best-Interests Exceptionalism

Rationale for Limited Applicability: Parental Autonomy

Given the wide-ranging nature of judicial inquiry and oversight
once the best-interests standard is employed, it is understandable that
the occasions on which courts engage in a full-fledged best-interests
assessment are limited. To allow the best-interests “inquest” 54 to
become widespread would infringe on parental autonomy and family
privacy.
Parental autonomy is protected under the Constitution as a
fundamental right. 55 This protection stems in part from parents’ own
51.

See, e.g., Muller v. Muller, No. 259271, 2005 WL 2810399, at *1 (Mich.
Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2005) (per curiam) (upholding trial court order
preventing parents from having “an unrelated member of the opposite
sex overnight while having parenting time with the minor children”).

52.

Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432–33 (1984).

53.

See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 658 N.Y.S.2d 548, 550 (App. Div. 1997)
(holding, in a case discussing which parent could better nurture the
child’s biracial identity, that while “race is not a dominant, controlling
or crucial factor[, it] must be weighed along with all other material
elements of the lives of [the] family” (second alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).

54.

Gishwiler v. Dodez, 4 Ohio St. 615, 618 (1855).

55.

See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–74 (2000) (finding that a
statute as applied to permit the court to order third-party visitation
over a parent’s objection, on the basis that to do so was in the child’s
best interests, violated the parent’s fundamental right to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of her children); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (striking down a law
requiring attendance at public school as violating “the liberty of parents
and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–401 (1923)
(holding that the “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment includes the right of parents to “bring up
children” and to “control the education of their own,” and striking down
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interests in the custody and care of their children, 56 and in part from
concerns about the policy implications of infringing on parental
rights. 57 Parental autonomy is widely seen as necessary to promote
the pluralistic society that is essential to our liberal democracy. 58 In
the words of a foundational Supreme Court decision protecting
parents’ rights to control the education and upbringing of their
children, these rights are necessary to prevent the government from
“standardiz[ing] its children” by dictating how and by whom they are
raised. 59
The limited applicability of the best-interests assessment serves to
protect parental autonomy by leaving the majority of families free
from judicial oversight. In an intact family that shows no evidence of
endangering its children, parents are free to raise their children as
they see fit. Parental autonomy is similarly facilitated by having clear
default rules determining who has the right to parent a newborn
child. These default rules have become murky in the wake of assisted
reproductive technology and other recent changes in family forms. 60
However, we do not, as a general matter, assess children’s interests
before making the original allocation of parental rights. There is
a prohibition on foreign language instruction as an unconstitutional
infringement on this liberty).
56.

See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (“[T]he interest of parents in the care,
custody, and control of their children . . . is perhaps the oldest of the
fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”).

57.

See Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto,
63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 937, 940–41 (1996) (enumerating rationales for
robust protections of parental autonomy); see also Maxine Eichner, Who
Should Control Children’s Education?: Parents, Children, and the State,
75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1339, 1340 (2007) (arguing that a liberal democracy
must protect parental autonomy while also accommodating
countervailing interests, in particular “the need for children to develop
the autonomy that liberalism demands”).

58.

See Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67
Tul. L. Rev. 955, 1022 (1993) (tracing the development of the
constitutional doctrine of family privacy and noting that the “diverse
ways of life promoted by differing family traditions . . . nourish our
liberal political system” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

59.

Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.

60.

See Courtney G. Joslin, Protecting Children(?): Marriage, Gender, and
Assisted Reproductive Technology, 83 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1177 (2010)
(noting that children born to unmarried couples through assisted
reproductive technology often fall outside the scope of parentage rules
that apply only to heterosexual married couples, and arguing that the
resulting uncertainty in parental rights and obligations renders children
financially vulnerable); Cahn, supra note 14, at 36–48 (discussing
potential solutions to the “indeterminacy of definitions of parenthood”
in light of “the new reproductive technologies as well as the changing
shape of the American family”).
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general agreement that—even apart from the question of a “natural”
parent’s fundamental right to the custody of his or her children—to
assess children’s interests in making the initial determination of
parental rights would give the state too much power to determine
how its citizens are formed. 61
b.

Rationale for Broad Scope: The Importance of Child Development
to the Adult Self

Given the importance we attribute to allowing parents to raise
their children as they see fit, in the name of what countervailing
interest do we allow courts to infringe on parental autonomy to the
extent that they do once they engage in the best-interests inquiry?
Particularly in today’s society, where divorce and custody disputes
are routine, we do not fault parents for divorcing or for disputing
custody of their children. The best-interests inquiry is not a
punishment; we do not characterize the parents in these cases as
wrongdoers who have, in acting badly, lost their right to autonomy. 62
The justification for the exceptional scope of family law’s bestinterests inquiry—a justification so powerful that it outweighs our
almost equally powerful concern with family privacy—lies in the
special nature of children and of childhood. Child-custody
jurisprudence tells us that children require special protection in part
because they are helpless. In the earliest Anglo-American custody
cases, when the power of courts to intervene in custody disputes was
first challenged, courts responded that they were empowered to step
in as necessary to protect children’s interests under the parens patriae

61.

See, e.g., David D. Meyer, The Constitutionality of “Best Interests”
Parentage, 14 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 857, 857 (2006) (“[T]o
imagine a new law of parentage focused exclusively on the needs and
interests of children . . . assumes a governmental control over the
question of parentage that would strike many as alien.”); Johnson v.
Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 n.10 (1993) (“[To] decide parentage based on
the best interests of the child . . . raises the repugnant specter of
governmental interference in matters implicating our most fundamental
notions of privacy, and confuses concepts of parentage and custody.”);
see also Cahn, supra note 14, at 44–60 (arguing that two-step approach
by which courts first identify a child’s parents and then award custody
in accordance with the child’s interests helps to limit judicial discretion
in determining parental status); Mary Patricia Byrn & Jenni Vainik
Ives, Which Came First the Parent or the Child?, 62 Rutgers L. Rev.
305, 330 (2010) (arguing that children’s interests require that states
create clear default rules that will clarify legal parentage from the
moment of birth).

62.

See, e.g., Ashwell v. Ashwell, 286 P.2d 983, 987 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1955) (“[I]n determining where custody of children shall lie the courts
are not engaged in a disciplinary action to punish parents for their
shortcomings as individuals . . . .”).
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jurisdiction, 63 which historically empowered the King to act as father
to those unable to protect themselves—namely, “infants, idiots, and
lunatics.” 64 Children—like incapable adults—do not possess the
faculties to make fully rational decisions or the power to implement
those decisions, and for that reason need adults to intervene on their
behalf. 65 As an early scholar of equity argued when the jurisdiction to
intervene in a custody dispute first came under assault, an argument
echoed by the House of Lords in a foundational case upholding the
jurisdiction, 66 such a power simply must be assumed to exist in any
civilized country. 67
The exceptional scope and power of family law’s best-interests
inquiry, however, is grounded in more than children’s mere
helplessness and incapacity. Child-custody jurisprudence, in discussing
why children’s interests merit such special attention, explains that the
state has a particular stake in children because children will become

63.

See, e.g., People ex rel. Ordronaux v. Chegaray, 18 Wend. 637, 643
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836) (noting that the statute conferring on court the
“power . . . of interfering between the husband and the wife in relation
to the charge and custody of their minor children” was “suggested by”
the English chancery practice of doing so on the basis of the “authority
. . . said to belong to the king, as parens patriae, and . . . exercised by
the chancellor as his representative”); Wellesley v. Wellesley, (1828) 4
Eng. Rep. 1078 (H.L.) 1081 (finding jurisdiction because, under parens
patriae, “it is the duty of the Crown to see that the child is properly
taken care of”).

64.

Sarah Abramowicz, Note, English Child Custody Law, 1660–1839: The
Origins of Judicial Intervention in Paternal Custody, 99 Colum. L.
Rev. 1344, 1346 (1999).

65.

See De Manneville v. De Manneville, (1804) 32 Eng. Rep. 762 (Ch.) 767
(“[O]f necessity the State must place somewhere a superintending power
over those, who cannot take care of themselves.”).

66.

See Wellesley, 4 Eng. Rep. at 1084 (“[I]f your Lordships were to hold
that there was not authority [to make orders with respect to the care of
infants], you would do the greatest possible mischief to the
country . . . .”).

67.

In defending Chancery’s jurisdiction to intervene in custody disputes,
John Fonblanque argued:
That in every civilized state, such a superintendence and
protective power does somewhere exist, will scarcely be
controverted. That if not found to exist elsewhere, it may be
presumed to vest in the crown, will not, I think, be denied.
Assuming, therefore, that the general superintendence of infants
did originally vest in the crown, I shall conclude, that eâ ratione,
it is now exercised in the court of Chancery as a branch of its
general jurisdiction.
John Fonblanque, A Treatise of Equity 229 n.a (London, J. & W.T.
Clarke 5th ed. 1820) (1794).

310

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 2·2012
Beyond Family Law

participatory adult citizens. 68 The assumption that underlies this
claim—and the best-interests inquiry more generally—is that
childhood is a formative stage. Children merit special protection not
just because they are vulnerable, but because the conditions of their
development will shape their future as adults. Childhood experience is
important because it will help to determine the adult that each child
will become.
The premise of the best-interests inquiry—that children are shaped
into their adult selves by their upbringing and early environment—is a
notion that we take for granted today, but was relatively new at the time
the best-interests standard first emerged in nineteenth-century American
legal practice.69 The environmental theory of child development had its
roots in the late seventeenth-century writings of John Locke, who
argued that children enter the world as a blank slate and develop
their understanding, capacities, and character through experience. 70
Locke’s emphasis on the importance of properly molding children into
adults with desirable characteristics 71 became increasingly influential
over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 72 The bestinterests inquiry grew out of a new solicitude for children’s experience,
on the theory that the way in which a child is brought up and
educated can determine the child’s adult self. 73
68.

See, e.g., Bishop v. Benear, 270 P. 569, 571 (Okla. 1928) (“These
children in the future will be men and women, and citizens of this state,
and their welfare and education and training along moral and religious
lines is of interest to every citizen of the state.”).

69.

For a history of the emergence of the best-interests doctrine in
nineteenth-century America, see Michael Grossberg, Governing
the Hearth 234–85 (1985).

70.

See John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
(Roger Woolhouse ed., Penguin Books 1997) (1690) (rejecting the notion
that ideas are innate and arguing that they are instead acquired through
experience); John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education
§ 32 (John W. Yolton & Jean S. Yolton eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1989)
(1693) [hereinafter Locke, Education] (“[T]he difference to be found
in the Manners and Abilities of Men, is owing more to their Education
than to anything else; we have reason to conclude, that great care is to
be had of the forming Children’s Minds, and giving them that seasoning
early, which shall influence their Lives always after.”).

71.

See Locke, Education, supra note 70, at § 217 (arguing that children
are like “white Paper, or Wax” that can be “moulded” through the
influences of early environment and education).

72.

See Jay Fliegelman, Prodigals and Pilgrims: The American
Revolution Against Patriarchal Authority, 1750–1800, at 12–
29 (1982) (demonstrating the importance of Locke’s educational and
developmental theories to early American thought).

73.

See Sarah Abramowicz, Childhood and the Limits of Contract, 21 Yale
J.L. & Human. 37, 62–80 (2009) (tracing the influence of the
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This developmentalist premise is reflected in the future-oriented
aspect of contemporary child-custody decisions. Courts awarding
custody try to alleviate children’s immediate pain and suffering. But
they take for granted that their goal is to find the caregiving
environment most likely to give each child the best possible
adulthood. 74 Judges making custody decisions often express anxiety
about the responsibility of making, on a child’s behalf, a decision that
will shape the child’s adult life. 75 Heightening the anxiety of making
such an important decision is the difficult nature of the best-interests
analysis, which courts have described as requiring them to predict the
future by assessing the type of adulthood that one or another
custodial situation is likely to create for a child. 76
B.

The Developmentalist Insights of the Best-Interests Analysis

The best-interests analysis of child custody law is focused—as is
no other area of law—on the connection between childhood experience
and the adult self. In assessing which custodial outcome is best for a
child, family-law courts often engage in a nuanced examination of
every aspect of a child’s early experience that might have bearing
upon the child’s future. Custody case law therefore offers a
perspective unique in legal analysis on the various factors that shape
children’s development.
In looking to children’s future well-being, custody courts often
articulate their goal in attending to the developmental process. While
courts differ in how they frame this goal, it typically involves
producing a well-adjusted and happy adult. Courts seek, in particular,

environmental theory of child development on early best-interests
jurisprudence).
74.

See, e.g., Harmon v. Emerson, 425 A.2d 978, 983 (Me. 1981) (“The
court’s decision may have a crucial and potentially long-term impact on
the physical and psychological well-being and potential future
development of the child at a time in its life when its future as a
balanced, healthy and happy individual is most clearly at stake.”).

75.

See, e.g., id. at 982–83 (“The issue of child custody is among the most
sensitive and vital questions that courts decide.”); Prost v. Greene, 652
A.2d 621, 633–34 (D.C. 1995) (Schwelb, J., concurring) (“[I]n this kind
of case, . . . the future of the children is in the balance . . . .”); In re
Minors of Luck, 10 Ohio Dec. 1, 2 (Prob. Ct. 1899) (“The destiny and
future usefulness and prosperity of a child, possessed of infinite
possibilities, is to be affected in no small degree by the judgment of the
court.”).

76.

See, e.g., In re C.B., 618 N.E.2d 598, 603 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)
(“[D]eciding what is in a child’s best interest is difficult, if not
impossible to predict without a crystal ball or the gift of foresight.”).
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to foster what they may term “independen[ce],” 77 “self-sufficien[cy],” 78
or “productiv[ity]” 79—in short, the “autonomy” that is the hallmark
of adulthood. 80 The overarching goal of the best-interests analysis is
to ensure that children acquire the emotional, psychological, cognitive,
and educational tools necessary to leave the dependency of childhood
behind and to function in the world as competent adults. 81
In some cases, courts have the luxury of deciding between two
relatively beneficial alternatives. Parents disputing custody may offer
extended evidence of the excellent schools, enriching extracurricular
activities, and nurturing family environment that each parent can
provide for the child. 82 Where each parent is well situated and
psychologically healthy, and the child is equally attached to both, a
court may base its decision on the marginal advantages offered by one
parent over another, such as worldwide travel, better parenting skills,
or superior educational opportunities. 83
More typically, judges face custody situations that will likely
inflict some degree of harm on a child. Some of these harms are
incident to the dispute itself and the changes in a child’s life that it
entails. The parental conflict that gave rise to the custody dispute
77.

Prost, 652 A.2d at 625 (finding that “regular interaction with both
parents [is] important to [children’s] development into independent,
well-rounded, confident adults” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

78.

Saplansky v. Saplansky, 19 Phila. Cnty. Rptr. 29, 42–43 (Pa. Ct. Com.
Pl. 1989) (selecting the custody arrangement most likely to render child
“relatively self-sufficient later in life”).

79.

Herrera v. Herrera, 944 S.W.2d 379, 386 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (“The
true test for the award of custody is to arrive at the point of deciding
with whom to place the child in preparation for a caring and productive
adult life.”).

80.

See, e.g., Harris v. Harris, No. FA 940543256, 1997 WL 710437, at *11
(Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 1997) (discussing how to foster child’s future
“autonomy”).

81.

See id. (“To achieve trust, autonomy, initiative, and industry children
need to be securely attached emotionally so that they can take on the
risks implicit in growing up. At the same time, they need to be
challenged by goals that are worth pursuing. Children who are fortunate
to experience such contexts are likely to enjoy their lives, while at the
same time contributing to the common good.” (quoting Mihaly
Csikszentmihalyi, Contexts of Optimal Growth in Childhood, 122
Dædalus: J Am. Acad. Arts & Sci. 31, 44 (1993))).

82.

See, e.g., Berg v. Berg, 490 N.W.2d 487, 491 (N.D. 1992) (comparing
the potential benefits that each of two loving and fit parents could
provide to their children).

83.

See id. at 490 (affirming trial court’s award of custody to the parent
whose superior ability to expose the children to new experiences
rendered her more likely to help them become “better prepared for
independent life, as adults”).

313

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 2·2012
Beyond Family Law

may put a child’s development at risk, as may the necessity of
separating children from one of their parents. Judges making custody
decisions also discuss a number of possible developmental harms that
are present in intact families as well, such as financial problems,
suboptimal parenting, or the disruptions caused by relocation.
Custody decisions therefore offer a wide-ranging picture of possible
harms to a child’s development, with a particular focus on harms that
may diminish the likelihood that a child will become a healthy,
productive, and autonomous adult.
The custody literature reflects a consensus that disruption of a
child’s environment can inflict significant harm on the child’s
development. Custody jurisprudence advocates providing children
with as much continuity and stability as is consistent with avoiding
other harms. 84 Within the general mandate to minimize disruptions to
children, the foremost change that custody courts seek to avoid is
disruption of a child’s tie to a parent or caretaker. Custody courts
since the nineteenth century have looked to protect the “ties of
affection” between children and their caregivers. 85 Today, custody
courts routinely observe that children separated from their parents
can suffer life-long harm to their emotional, social, and cognitive
development. 86 A court awarding custody will often cite psychological
studies and expert testimony detailing the risk to children of

84.

See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 722.23 (2012) (instructing judges
awarding custody to consider, inter alia, the “desirability of maintaining
continuity” in a child’s environment and caretaking arrangements, and
to weigh this against factors such as the child’s potential exposure to
domestic violence); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 466 A.2d 937, 938 (N.H. 1983)
(acknowledging a “correlation between the stability of family
relationships and the healthy psychological development of children”).

85.

See The Queen v. Gyngall, [1893] 2 Q.B. 232 at 244 (refusing to remove
child from caregiver where this would constitute “a very serious
dislocation of an existing tie”). The importance of protecting children’s
“ties of affection” to their psychological parent figure was influentially
set forth in the English case of Gyngall, 2 Q.B. at 243, which was then
widely cited by American custody courts. See, e.g., Finlay v. Finlay, 148
N.E. 624, 626 (N.Y. 1925) (Cardozo, J.) (citing Gyngall on the
importance to children’s welfare of the ties of affection).

86.

See, e.g., Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486, 493 (Cal. 1986) (“We have
frequently stressed . . . the importance of stability and continuity in the
life of a child, and the harm that may result from disruption of
established patterns of care and emotional bonds.”). The developmental
harm that children stand to suffer when separated from a primary
parent figure was detailed by Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert
J. Solnit in their 1973 work Beyond the Best Interests of the Child,
which has been widely influential in child-custody jurisprudence. See
Joseph Goldstein et al., Beyond the Best Interests of the
Child (1973).
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separation from a parent at a given developmental stage. 87 Courts are
especially wary of separating an infant or toddler from a primary
caregiver, on the basis that children who undergo such a separation
often have trouble regulating their emotions and forming relationships
later in life, and may also suffer deficits in language acquisition and
other cognitive skills. 88
In recent years, courts and legislatures have increasingly insisted
on the importance to children’s development of maintaining ties with
both parents. 89 A number of state custody statutes specify that courts
should take into account a child’s developmental stage, and the
related need for contact with both parents, when arranging parenting
plans or visiting schedules 90 or when assessing whether the primary
caretaker should be permitted to relocate. 91 Custody courts may
87.

See, e.g., In re S.J., 846 N.E.2d 633, 636 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (citing
research indicating that when a two-year-old’s relationship “with a
primary caregiver is disrupted, the young child can develop trust issues
that may inhibit development of his own personality and his ability to
form relationships”); see also, e.g., In re Luis, 847 N.Y.S.2d 835, 846–47
(Fam. Ct. 2007) (discussing importance of toddler stage to child’s future
emotional and intellectual development, and noting that changes in
family arrangements during this stage “can alter the developmental
course for children in a major way”).

88.

See, e.g., In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 21 (Mo. 2004) (en banc)
(“Countless psychological and child development studies have shown
that children—especially infants and young children under the age of
five—who are needlessly separated from their familiar parent suffer
resulting deficits in their emotional and intellectual development.”).

89.

See, e.g., Luis, 847 N.Y.S.2d at 846–47 (discussing the potential harm
that could result from disrupting the father-child bond between the ages
of eighteen and thirty-six months); Mark L. v. Gail S., N.Y. L.J., May
30, 2006, at 25 (Nassau Cnty. Sup. Ct.) (observing that mother’s
limitation of children’s contact with father created risk of “personality
disorder features and pathological interpersonal relationships in the
future”). For an early work advocating protection of children’s ties to
their secondary as well as primary caretakers, see David L. Chambers,
Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83
Mich. L. Rev. 477, 533–35 (1984).

90.

See, e.g., Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 650 (2010) (“[I]t is in the best
interests of [a] minor child to have the opportunity for maximum
continuing physical and emotional contact with both parents, unless
direct physical harm or significant emotional harm to the child or a
parent is likely to result from such contact.”); see also Cummings v.
Cummings, No. M2003-00086-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 2346000, at *9
(Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2004) (“[T]he child’s developmental level is a
very important consideration in fashioning a parenting arrangement.”).

91.

See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann § 61.13001 (West Supp. 2012) (instructing
court ruling on parent’s relocation request to consider “[t]he age and
developmental stage of the child . . . and the likely impact the relocation
will have on the child’s . . . emotional development” and on the child’s
relationship with the non-relocating parent); Sylvester v. Sylvester, 992
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insist, for instance, that children under the age of five maintain
weekly contact with both parents, on the basis that younger children
do not have a well-developed sense of time and therefore need
frequent contact with both parents in order to bond with them, as
well as that even a two-week separation from a parent could inflict
trauma on a very young child. 92
Courts assessing children’s interests also recognize a number of
other forms of instability that can impair children’s development.
Foremost among these is the instability created by a parent’s financial
distress. Although some jurisdictions prohibit custody courts from
considering a parent’s financial situation in awarding custody, 93 others
allow 94 or even require 95 such consideration. Courts recognize, albeit
reluctantly, that financial deprivation and its attendant harms—
including frequent moves, foreclosures, material deprivation, and
parental stress—can undermine a parent’s ability to provide children
with a sufficiently safe and stable environment for them to prosper
and thrive as they develop into adults. 96
So. 2d 296, 296–97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (delaying parent’s
relocation until child reached five years of age).
92.

See, e.g., Cummings, 2004 WL 2346000, at *9 (explaining reversal of
trial court’s order alternating six-month custodial periods with each
parent).

93.

See, e.g., Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486, 491 (Cal. 1986) (en banc)
(“[C]omparative income or economic advantage is not a permissible
basis for a custody award.”).

94.

See, e.g., P.A. v. A.H.O., 757 N.W.2d 58, 62–63 (N.D. 2008) (finding
parents’ relative income levels a permissible factor in the best interests
analysis).

95.

See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 722.23(c) (West 2011) (directing
custody court to consider “[t]he capacity and disposition of the parties
involved to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care . . . , and
other material needs”); see also, e.g., Bjorkland v. Eastman, 719
N.Y.S.2d 744, 747 (App. Div. 2001) (“Courts must weigh many factors
when making custody decisions, and the respective financial situations of
the parties is one such factor to be weighed with others.” (citation
omitted)). But see Dempsey v. Dempsey, 296 N.W.2d 813, 813 (Mich.
1980) (per curiam) (holding that courts assessing the statutory best
interests factors should not place undue weight on parties’ economic
circumstances).

96.

See, e.g., Secada v. Secada, No. FA990174204S, 2002 WL 1041726, at
*11 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 30, 2002) (finding that the financial
insecurity of the parent would “inevitably affect and harm the
children”); Housand v. Housand, 509 S.E.2d 827, 830 (S.C. Ct. App.
1998) (recognizing potential developmental harms that accompany
financial deprivation); Fanning v. Fanning, 717 P.2d 346, 353 (Wyo.
1986) (“We believe that best interest is attendant with educational
opportunity and stable environment for which economic resources are
not insignificant.”).
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A related harm that custody courts seek to avoid is disruption of
a child’s established custodial environment. The best-interests
assessment frequently details the developmental damage that children
can suffer when they are forced to leave their home, school, or
network of family and friends. Each of these disruptions, courts note,
can thwart a child’s educational and social progress. 97 A court may for
this reason refuse to allow the custodial parent to relocate, even when
the relocation would otherwise benefit the parent and child, for
instance by providing the parent with a more desirable job. 98
The best-interests standard therefore provides a primer on how
various aspects of a child’s environment can influence the likelihood
that the child will develop into a functional and autonomous adult.
Best-interests jurisprudence holds that children’s development suffers
above all when a child is separated from a parent. Children’s
development is also threatened whenever a parent’s situation is
disrupted to an extent that the child lives the consequences. Where a
parent suffers from job loss, foreclosure, forced relocation, or a decline
in material well-being, the child suffers as well. When a child’s
environment is disrupted, the child can experience more than
transient discomfort. A sufficient disruption can derail a child’s
intellectual, emotional, and educational development, diminishing the
likelihood that the child will become the well-regulated, capable, and
productive adult that custody decisions hope to produce.
C.

Implications

The best-interests assessment of child-custody law brings out the
extent to which—in every family, including the majority of families
that never come before a custody court—children are formed by
conditions beyond their control. Judges attend to child development
primarily in the context of custody disputes. In most other instances,
children are delegated to their parents’ care, and no further attention
is paid to how they are raised. The family is in most cases a black box
that the law declines to peer inside. When judges assess children’s
interests in custody disputes, they shed light on what goes on in
families generally. In lifting the lid off the black box of the family,
these cases demonstrate the extent to which children at once have no
control over their upbringing and are largely determined by it.

97.

See, e.g., Dow v. Dow, 761 N.Y.S.2d 682, 683 (App. Div. 2003)
(attributing child’s educational difficulties and behavioral problems to
mother’s frequent moves).

98.

See, e.g., Cohn v. Cohn, 658 So. 2d 479, 481 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994)
(denying mother’s relocation request on the basis that “removing the
children from their current surroundings and environment at this time
was not in their best interests” given the potential consequences “on the
children’s educational, cultural, and social needs”).
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Child-custody case law thus raises the question of whether the law
should do more than it currently does to facilitate those factors of
family life—such as child-parent contact, stability, and financial wellbeing—that, according to the best-interests literature, are most likely
to affect a child’s chances of becoming an autonomous, productive,
and psychologically healthy adult. The primary reason the law does
not get involved in the workings of the intact family is that judicial
intervention would diminish parental autonomy, a fundamental right
necessary to the flourishing of a pluralistic, democratic society with a
diverse citizenry. 99 But what about situations where the law could
work alongside parents to strengthen their ability to provide their
children with optimal conditions of development, in a manner that
does not interfere with—and in fact fosters—parental autonomy?
Family-law scholars currently debate the extent to which it is
possible for the government to help parents carry out their task of
child rearing without impinging on parents’ autonomy, for instance by
subsidizing day care or education. 100 This Article takes a different
approach. Instead of considering the ways in which the law could
more actively foster optimal conditions of child development, the
Article asks instead that we consider inflicting less harm on children
than we currently do. For there are a number of legal cases that have
nothing to do with children directly, but where courts, in passing
judgment on children’s parents, reshape families and family
circumstances in ways that harm children’s development. What would
it look like to assess these cases in light of the robust perspective on
children’s interests and child development articulated by courts
deciding custody disputes?

II. Beyond Family Law: Cases Affecting Children
Indirectly
Within the context of family law, courts and commentators faced
with the problem of how to resolve custody disputes articulate at
length how children are affected by the circumstances of their parents’
lives. When a child stands to be separated from a parent figure,
99.

See Dailey, supra note 58, at 1022 (“In the United States, the process of
becoming a self-governing individual capable of meaningful political
participation takes place initially and primarily within the family. . . .
Our liberal democracy rejects the conformity resulting from direct state
indoctrination; instead it requires intermediate institutions to initiate
individuals into the political life of the state.”).

100. See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 12, at 307 (advocating an approach that
“allows the caretaker-dependent unit to flourish, supported and
subsidized by the larger society without the imposition of conformity”);
McClain, supra note 11, at 90 (arguing that “both governmental action
and restraint are necessary to help families engage in nurturing the
capacities of family members”).
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exposed to financial instability or deprivation, or subjected to a
disruptive change in environment, courts assessing children’s interests
routinely act to prevent such outcomes in the name of protecting
children from developmental harm.
Across the rest of the legal canon, attention to children’s interests
is significantly more limited. Courts may attend to children when
they are parties to a case, or when they are directly involved, for
instance as the victim of a crime. There is very little attention to
children, however, in the great majority of situations where they are
affected by cases involving their parents.
This Part will discuss two areas of law in which children are
potentially affected by cases involving their parents: criminal law and
contract law. From the perspective of family law’s best-interests
jurisprudence, we can see that children’s development can be affected,
often profoundly, by cases involving their parents in both fields. As
we will see, however, criminal law gives only limited consideration to
children’s interests in such cases, and contract law often fails to
address the matter altogether.
While criminal law scholars have long puzzled over whether to
consider children in cases involving their parents, they have done so
from the limited perspective of their own doctrinal field, and thus
have failed to recognize the full theoretical import of whether to
attend to children’s interests in such cases. In contract law, scholars
have attended to children’s interests only with respect to contracts
that redefine the family, and have largely overlooked the ways in
which children are affected by other parental contracts. Scholars in
both criminal law and contract law have thus missed an opportunity
to consider the connection between children’s interests and the
underlying goals and premises of their respective fields.
A.

Criminal Law

Perhaps the area of law that most dramatically illustrates the
collateral consequences for children of cases involving their parents is
criminal law. Children are potentially affected by many aspects of
criminal cases involving their parents. For instance, the very
definition of what is and is not a criminal offense can affect a
defendant’s child, sometimes in a protective way, as where the law
criminalizes acts of violence against the child. 101 Indeed, the law can
often reshape families for the better, as it does in criminalizing
domestic violence. 102
101. See, e.g., W. Va. Code Ann. § 61-8D (LexisNexis 2010) (criminalizing
acts of violence against child by a parent, guardian, or custodian).
102. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 12.55.155(c)(18)(C) (2012) (providing for
sentence enhancement where domestic violence committed in the
presence of a child living with victim or perpetrator).
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But children’s interests are also at stake when their parents are
convicted of crimes unrelated to the children. And here, unlike in the
child abuse or domestic violence context, the child is not at the
forefront of the court’s analysis. Nonetheless, children may well be
deeply affected by the outcome of such a case. Children are especially
likely to be affected by a criminal case involving a parent where the
parent faces incarceration. This Section will therefore focus on the
effects of parental incarceration on minor children, and the extent to
which the existing sentencing regime takes these effects into account
when sentencing parents.
1.

Effect of Parental Incarceration on Children

Family law’s best-interests analysis helps to bring out the extent of
developmental damage that parental incarceration can inflict on a
child. As we have seen, best-interests jurisprudence holds up separation
of parent and child as particularly harmful to a child’s development. A
child whose parent is incarcerated endures an extreme form of such
separation. Many children see their incarcerated parents rarely or not
at all: in 2007, nearly fifty percent of both incarcerated mothers and
incarcerated fathers had no visits with their minor children, 103 and
many incarcerated parents had no form of contact with their
children. 104 Prisons are often located far from the communities in which
prisoners resided prior to their incarceration, which, in combination
with limited visiting hours and other prison policies, can make
visitation pragmatically difficult or prohibitively expensive for children
and their caretakers. 105
This form of extreme separation from a parent can thwart the
bonding process between a parent and a young child, leading to the
attachment problems that family-law courts try to prevent when they
103. See Lauren E. Glaze & Laura M. Maruschak, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report: Parents
in Prison and Their Minor Children 18 app. tbl. 10 (rev. 2010).
104. See id.
105. See Chesa Boudin, Children of Incarcerated Parents: The Child’s
Constitutional Right to the Family Relationship, 101 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 77, 99–104 (2011) (describing aspects of prison policies
that make visitation of parents difficult for children and their
caretakers); Myrna S. Raeder, Gender-Related Issues in a Post-Booker
Federal Guidelines World, 37 McGeorge L. Rev. 691, 745–46 (2006)
(noting that because of the limited number of federal prisons for women,
mothers convicted of federal crimes are especially likely to be
incarcerated far away from their children); Philip M. Genty, Damage to
Family Relationships as a Collateral Consequence of Parental
Incarceration, 30 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1671, 1675 (2003) (analyzing
data suggesting that parental incarceration limits parent-child contact
to an extent that inflicts “long-lasting . . . [damage] upon the parentchild relationship”).
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insist on frequent contact between parents and children in the infancy
and toddler stage. 106 Disruption of an existing bond between parent and
child is also potentially damaging. For children under the age of five,
both lack of parent-child bonding and disruption of an existing bond
can create difficulties in cognitive and language development as well as
in forming relationships and regulating emotions later in life. 107 Older
children separated from their parents suffer developmental harm as
well, often in the form of behavioral and educational difficulties. 108
The damage inflicted on a child by separation from the
incarcerated parent is often compounded by the financial and other
difficulties that parental incarceration tends to create. 109 If the parent
contributed to the household finances or to household labor, the loss
of that contribution through incarceration will diminish the child’s
material well-being. 110 As custody courts acknowledge, a decline in a
child’s socio-economic circumstances can reduce the likelihood that
the child will flourish. 111 Where a parent is imprisoned, the child’s
remaining caretaker is often forced to take on new employment or to
move to more affordable housing, sometimes including homeless
shelters. As a result, the child is subjected to disruptions in education,
home life, and environment, as well as to the anxiety and diminished
availability of an overburdened caretaker. 112 We know from family
106. See supra text accompanying notes 83–92.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 83–92.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 83–92.
109. See Joyce A. Arditti, Jennifer Lambert-Shute & Karen Joest, Saturday
Morning at the Jail: Implications of Incarceration for Families and
Children, 52 Fam. Rel. 195, 201–02 (2003) (summarizing study finding
that incarceration inflicts myriad harms on inmates’ families, including
financial loss, emotional stress, declining health, and social stigma, and
concluding that “[w]e believe that incarceration pushes many families
over, ripening conditions related to rotten outcomes for family life and
child development” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
110. See id. at 199–200 (describing multiple factors contributing to decline in
financial well-being of families in which a member has been incarcerated,
including loss of income from the incarcerated parent, increased
likelihood that the remaining parent will leave paid work in order to
care for the children, and the expenses associated with incarceration).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 83–86.
112. See Nell Bernstein, All Alone in the World: Children of the
Incarcerated 117–20 (2005) (detailing the pervasive disruptions in the
life of the child of an incarcerated parent); Donald Braman, Doing
Time on the Outside (2004) (employing ethnographic methodology to
document the damage incarceration inflicts on family structure and on
the material well-being of offenders’ families and communities); Arditti
et al., supra note 109, at 200 (describing parenting strain, difficulty
coping, and sense of isolation experienced by family members of
incarcerated parents).
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law’s best-interests jurisprudence that each of these factors can harm
a child’s emotional, cognitive, and educational progress to a
significant degree. 113
Despite the myriad harms that incarceration of a parent inflicts
on a child, those children who are able to reside with a remaining
parent are the relatively fortunate ones. When a single parent is
incarcerated, the child may be placed with relatives—often
grandparents—or family friends who struggle to cope with caring for
the child and as a result may move the child from one household to
another. 114 Here children suffer repeated instances of the instability
and disruption that family law presents as destructive to a child’s
development. 115 A number of children, moreover, are placed in foster
care as a result of parental incarceration, or are have been placed in
foster care shortly before their parent’s arrest. 116 Children in foster
care are frequently moved from one placement to the next, 117 and
often suffer abuse and neglect. 118 Under the Adoption and Safe
Families Act, parental rights must be terminated where a child is in
foster care for more than fifteen months of any twenty-two month
period, unless certain limited exceptions apply. 119 Where parental

113. See supra text accompanying note 86.
114. See Bernstein, supra note 112, at 109–42 (describing financial and
practical struggles of grandparents caring for children of incarcerated
parents).
115. See, e.g., Goldstein et al., supra note 86, at 32–33 (observing that
when children’s ties to their parents or caretakers are interrupted
repeatedly, children “tend to grow up as persons who lack warmth in
their contact with fellow beings”).
116. See Timothy Ross, Ajay Khashu, & Mark Wamsley, Vera Inst.
of Justice, Hard Data on Hard Times: An Empirical Analysis
of Maternal Incarceration, Foster Care, and Visitation (2004)
(presenting study of incarcerated mothers showing that while some
children are placed in foster care as the result of a mother’s arrest, in
the majority of cases, a child’s placement in foster care precedes the
mother’s arrest, and theorizing that the child’s removal tends to make
arrest more likely by accelerating the mother’s downward spiral).
117. See Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise and
Failure of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 Minn. L.
Rev. 637, 653–54 (1999) (noting that children in foster care tend to
experience multiple placements).
118. See generally Michael B. Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Case for
Constitutional Protection of Foster Children from Abuse and Neglect, 23
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 199 (1988) (describing abuse and neglect
experienced by children in foster care).
119. See Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) of 1997, 42 U.S.C.
§ 675(5)(E) (2006).
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rights are thus terminated, the tie between parent and child is severed
altogether as a result of incarceration. 120
Family law’s best-interests jurisprudence helps demonstrate the
myriad ways in which parental incarceration can harm children’s
development. Separation of child from parent, lack of parent-child
contact, financial instability, and disruption of a child’s
environment—all likely results of parental incarceration—each
threaten children’s well-being and developmental progress. When
these factors are compounded, as they so often are when a parent is
imprisoned, family law tells us that the effect is to diminish the
likelihood that the child will become an autonomous, productive, and
emotionally healthy adult.
2.

Current Judicial Approaches

Criminal law is one of the few areas of law outside of family law
that will on occasion take children’s interests into account in cases
involving their parents, and it does so primarily in the context of
sentencing. A number of jurisdictions provide for some consideration of
children’s interests when sentencing parents. Given the significance of
parental incarceration for children, this is not surprising. Even within
criminal-sentencing law, however, consideration of children’s interests in
cases involving parents is often limited or prohibited altogether.
Beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, the federal government and the
majority of states moved from a flexible sentencing system in which
judges could consider a number of factors to a more tightly regulated
one in which judicial discretion was significantly constrained. 121 At the
federal level, this shift occurred with the adoption of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines in 1987, 122 which apply in conjunction with
independently enacted statutory mandatory minimums for certain
offenses. 123 Many states adopted their own statutory guidelines to
120. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, and the Systemic
Punishment of Black Mothers, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1474, 1498–99 (2012)
(discussing how ASFA interacts with maternal incarceration to
accelerate the termination of maternal rights, and analyzing the
systemic harm inflicted on black mothers and their children by the
intersection of the foster care and maternal incarceration); Genty, supra
note 105, at 1677 (“ASFA has likely had a disproportionate impact
upon incarcerated parents with children in foster care.”).
121. See Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, Other States,
and the Federal Courts: A Twenty-Year Retrospective, 12 Fed. Sent’g
Rep. 69, 72 (1999) (discussing the consensus that emerged in the 1970s
that judicial discretion in sentencing should be reduced).
122. See id. at 70.
123. See Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 Cardozo
L. Rev. 1, 8–9 (2010) (describing history and proliferation of federal
mandatory minimums, which are enacted by statute and “set the lower
limits for sentencing particular offenses and particular offenders”); see
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limit judicial discretion at sentencing 124 or achieved similar results
through rules such as mandatory minimums and habitual offender
laws. 125
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines greatly limit the situations in
which courts can take children’s interests into account when
sentencing parents. Under the Guidelines, “family ties”—including
those between parent and child—are “not ordinarily relevant” at
sentencing. 126 According to commentary added to the Guidelines in
2003, this means that courts following the Guidelines can only take
children’s interests into account when they stand to suffer a degree of
harm that “substantially exceeds” the harm that a child would
“ordinarily” suffer upon a parent’s incarceration. 127 This, in turn,
requires, at a minimum, that the incarceration will result in a “loss of
essential caretaking” to the child, such that no viable caretaker can be
found to take the parent’s place. 128
Some courts interpreting the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have
found that the harm facing a child is not sufficiently extraordinary to
merit consideration even where the child stands to enter foster care as
a result of the parent’s incarceration, 129 or where the offender who
generally U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Report to Congress:
Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice
System (2011) (providing overview of federal mandatory minimums,
including their history and their interaction with the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines).
124. See Frase, supra note 121, at 72.
125. See John F. Pfaff, The Continued Vitality of Structured Sentencing
Following Blakeley: The Effectiveness of Voluntary Guidelines, 54
UCLA L. Rev. 235, 242 (2006) (identifying mandatory minimums and
habitual offender laws as among the sentencing reforms that gained
popularity in the 1970s); Michael Tonry, The Mostly Unintended Effects
of Mandatory Penalties: Two Centuries of Consistent Findings, 38
Crime & Just. 65, 75 (2009) (“Between 1975 and 1996, mandatory
minimums were America’s most frequently enacted sentencing law
changes. . . . By 1994, every state had adopted mandatory penalties;
most had several.” (citation omitted)).
126. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5H1.6 (2011).
127. Id. § 5H1.6 cmt. 1(B)(ii).
128. Id. § 5H1.6 cmt. 1(B)(i), (iii).
129. See, e.g., United States v. Leandre, 132 F.3d 796, 807–08 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (upholding district court’s denial of departure for single father
whose children faced foster care); United States v. Brand, 907 F.2d 31,
33 (4th Cir. 1990) (“A sole, custodial parent is not a rarity in today’s
society, and imprisoning such a parent will by definition separate the
parent from the children. It is apparent that in many cases the other
parent may be unwilling or unable to care for the children, and that the
children will have to live with relatives, friends, or even in foster
homes.”).
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faces incarceration is a single parent with several children, including
an infant. 130 These courts require medical problems or other special
circumstances before a child’s interests can be taken into account
when sentencing parents. 131 Other courts have interpreted the
Guidelines to permit consideration of children’s interests in a wider
set of circumstances, for instance where the child will be losing a
single parent or a primary caretaker. 132
Many states have taken a similar approach, either by statute or
through case law. A number of states follow an “excessive hardship”
standard comparable to that of the federal guidelines. 133 Other states
require courts to focus on the wrongfulness of defendants’ conduct
rather than on harm to their families, and thus forbid consideration of
a defendant’s children altogether unless relevant to the egregiousness
of their parent’s criminal conduct. 134 Some states, by contrast, allow
children’s interests to be considered more broadly when sentencing
parents. 135 As in the federal system, state sentencing regimes often
impose an additional restriction on judicial discretion in the form of
mandatory minimums that apply to particular offenses or offenders. 136
130. See, e.g., United States v. Dyce, 91 F.3d 1462, 1466–67 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(finding family circumstances not sufficiently extraordinary to warrant a
downward departure for single mother of three children under the age of
four, including an infant of three months who was still being breast-fed).
131. See, e.g., United States v. Roselli, 366 F.3d 58, 62–63, 70 (1st Cir. 2004)
(finding downward departure warranted where defendant’s two young
children required extensive caretaking for cystic fibrosis, and his wife
was herself unwell and unable to care for them); United States v.
Spedden, 917 F. Supp. 404, 406–07, 409 (E.D. Va. 1996) (departing
downward where wife suffered from cancer and daughter from a
potentially fatal illness, while noting that “[t]he Fourth Circuit has
construed downward departures based on family ties very narrowly”).
132. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 1992)
(upholding downward departure on basis of single parent status).
133. See, e.g., 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/5-5-3.1(a)(11) (West 2007)
(requiring “excessive hardship” for child’s interests to be taken into
account); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:44-1(b)(11) (West 2005) (same);
People v. Pearson, 462 N.W.2d 839, 843 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990)
(requiring “exceptional circumstances”).
134. See, e.g., Rafferty v. State, 799 So. 2d 243, 248 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001) (reversing as inappropriate downward departure that was given
on basis that defendant’s child needed financial support); State v. Amo,
882 P.2d 1188, 1191 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (“The birth of [defendant’s]
son while she was in custody does not make the commission of her three
crimes any less offensive.”).
135. See, e.g., State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982) (interpreting
sentencing guidelines to permit consideration of children’s interests in
determining whether to suspend a parent’s sentence).
136. See Tonry, supra note 125, at 75 (describing the proliferation of
mandatory minimums in the states between the 1970s and the 1990s).
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At both the federal level and in many states, guidelines-imposed
limits on considering children’s interests when sentencing parents
have recently been brought into question by the Supreme Court’s
2005 decision in United States v. Booker, which rendered the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines merely advisory, on the ground that imposing
mandatory sentences on the basis of judge-found facts violates the
Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. 137 Under Booker, federal
courts must still calculate the Guidelines sentence, but are free to
depart from it. 138 The Booker decision also brought into question the
validity of many state sentencing regimes. 139
Federal courts were initially uncertain about the extent to which
Booker left courts free to exercise discretion in imposing criminal
sentences. 140 One area of uncertainty was the degree to which courts
could reject policies embedded in the Sentencing Guidelines, including
the limitation on taking children’s interests into account when
sentencing parents. 141 Left with the option of following the Guidelines
and the possibility of reversal if they did not, many courts continued
to follow the Guidelines rule that children’s interests are not relevant
unless incarceration would result in the loss of an irreplaceable
caretaker and in so doing inflict substantially greater harm than
ordinarily suffered by the child of an incarcerated parent. 142 Given
that, as we have seen, most children of incarcerated parents stand to
suffer a fair degree of harm, 143 this rule significantly limits
consideration of children’s interests when sentencing parents.
In the years following Booker, however, the Supreme Court has
made increasingly clear the extent to which the Guidelines are now
truly advisory. In Gall v. United States, the Court held that a
137. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226, 245 (2005).
138. Id. at 259–60.
139. See Stephanos Bibas & Susan Klein, The Sixth Amendment and
Criminal Sentencing, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 775, 785–88 (2008)
(discussing effect of Booker on state approaches to sentencing).
140. See Robert J. Anello & Jodi Misher Peikin, Evolving Roles in Federal
Sentencing: The Post-Booker/Fanfan World, 1 Fed. Cts. L. Rev. 301,
331–32 (2006) (describing the uncertainty wrought by Booker).
141. Compare United States v. Menyweather, 447 F.3d 625, 634 (9th Cir.
2006) (finding that Booker allows sentencing courts greater leeway to
take into account family ties), with United States v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585,
594 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding that even after Booker, sentencing courts
are still largely constrained by the Guidelines, and can only significantly
depart to take into account family ties when faced with “dramatic
facts”).
142. See Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A
First Look, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 18 (2010) (finding that many postBooker judges continued to sentence within the Guidelines).
143. See supra Part II.A.1.
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sentencing court can depart significantly from the Guidelines even in
the absence of extraordinary circumstances. 144 In the companion case
of Kimbrough v. United States, the Court further clarified that district
courts may now reject a Guidelines sentence on the basis of a
disagreement with the policy that underlies the Guidelines
approach. 145 This line of cases opens up the possibility that federal
sentencing courts may revisit their hesitant approach to considering
children’s interests when sentencing parents.
In the wake of Booker and its progeny, both the federal
government and the states are newly debating how to reframe their
approaches to sentencing. 146 Added pressure to revisit criminal
sentencing has come from a need to reduce the prison population, for
both financial 147 and constitutional reasons. 148 An issue this debate
must confront is whether and to what extent courts should be allowed
to take children’s interests into account when sentencing a parent.
Now is thus a critical time to revisit the rationales for and against
considering children’s interests when incarcerating their parents.
3.

Current Debates About Considering Children
When Sentencing Parents

As sentencing expert Douglas Berman has noted, while the
literature “makes quite compelling the social policy reasons for” taking
children’s interests into account when sentencing parents, 149 the
criminal-justice rationale for doing so has been undertheorized. 150
144. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 47 (2007).
145. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 100 (2007) (upholding
rejection of Guidelines sentence on the basis of district court’s
disagreement with the Guidelines policy implementing a 100:1 ratio for
sentences involving crack versus powder cocaine). For an extended
analysis of the implications of Booker, Gall, and Kimbrough for
consideration of parental status at sentencing, see Sarah Abramowicz,
Rethinking Parental Incarceration, 82 U. Colo. L. Rev. 793, 823–29
(2011).
146. See, e.g., Symposium, Judicial Discretion: A Look Forward and a Look
Back Five Years After Booker, 22 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 297 (2010).
147. See Jennifer Steinhauer, To Trim Costs, States Relax Hard Line on
Prisons, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 2009, at Al (describing actions taken by
a number of states to reduce their prison populations in order to control
mounting prison costs).
148. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011) (directing California to
reduce its prison population in order to address prison overcrowding
that created conditions violating the Eighth Amendment prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment).
149. Douglas A. Berman, Addressing Why: Developing Principled Rationales
for Family-Based Departures, 13 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 274, 278 (2001).
150. See id. at 274 (“Because there has not been serious attention given to
precisely why family circumstances should lead to a reduced sentence,
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Sentencing theory traditionally focuses on the goals of criminal law—
deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation, and retribution. 151 Criminal
law typically seeks to achieve these goals by focusing on the behavior of
the defendant. Berman acknowledges that parental status can have
some bearing on the wrongfulness of a defendant’s actions, the extent
to which incarceration will inflict punishment, and the likelihood of
rehabilitation. 152 He argues, however, that it is difficult to articulate a
principled basis for considering children’s interests for their own sake
that is consistent with current sentencing jurisprudence. 153
Advocates for both prisoners and children have nonetheless long
argued for greater consideration of parental status when incarcerating
offenders. 154 Some take a defendant-centered approach to the issue. A
number of commentators point to studies showing that maintaining
ties between offenders and their children reduces rates of recidivism
among parents. 155 Protecting parent-child ties, then, can be seen as a
measure to reduce crime rates. Professor Myrna Raeder, a frequent
advocate for the rights of incarcerated mothers and their children,
suggests that considering parental status is also necessary as a matter
of fairness, since parents who are incarcerated are punished more
harshly than similarly situated offenders who are not parents, by
virtue of the added pain inflicted by separation from their children. 156
She argues that sentencing courts deciding whether and where to
incarcerate a parent should consider not only the offender’s parental
the departure jurisprudence concerning family circumstances has been
purposeless and sentencing outcomes have been inconsistent.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
151. See id. at 276.
152. See id. at 277–78.
153. See id. at 274 (“[I]t is difficult to provide a principled explanation for
exactly why a criminal offender should merit a lesser punishment simply
because he or she has a spouse or children or other relatives.”); see also
id. at 278 (calling on the Sentencing Commission to “develop express
principles concerning whether and when reduced sentences may be
permitted under the guidelines based on the potential harm to a
defendant’s family”).
154. See, e.g., Genty, supra note 105, at 1683–84 (“The defendant’s role as a
parent must be an explicit factor in sentencing.”).
155. See Leslie Acoca & Myrna S. Raeder, Severing Family Ties: The Plight
of Nonviolent Female Offenders and Their Children, 11 Stan. L. &
Pol’y Rev. 133, 136 (1999) (“[T]here is considerable evidence that
family relationships . . . affect the mother’s rehabilitation.”); John
Hagan & Ronit Dinovitzer, Collateral Consequences of Imprisonment for
Children, Communities, and Prisoners, 26 Crime & Just. 121, 142
(1999) (“[S]trong family relationships during incarceration may lower
recidivism rates . . . .”).
156. See Raeder, supra note 105, at 745–46.
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status but also the extent to which incarceration in a particular
facility would make contact and visitation with a child more
difficult. 157
Among those who take a child-centered approach to parental
incarceration, the most common argument is that putting parents in
prison has a criminogenic effect on the next generation, by increasing
the likelihood that the children themselves will commit crimes in the
future. 158 A related argument is that incarcerating parents unfairly
punishes children who have done nothing wrong. This argument is
typically framed in criminogenic terms as well. As Judge Patricia
Wald put it, incarcerating parents turns blameless children into the
“next generation of . . . sociopathic criminals.” 159
The theoretical argument for considering parental status at
sentencing has been enhanced in recent years by scholars who have
added a constitutional perspective to a position that formerly was
largely grounded in the pragmatic goal of reducing crime rates and
the moral imperative of treating either offenders or their children
fairly. Thus, Myrna Raeder contends that incarcerating mothers
implicates the fundamental rights of parents to the custody and care
of their children and argues that courts should take this into account
more than they currently do when imposing sentences of
incarceration. 160 Chesa Boudin, who takes a child-centered approach
to the issue, has put forth the argument that consideration of
children’s interests when sentencing parents and developing prison
policies is necessary in order to protect children’s First Amendment
right of freedom of association and their due process liberty interest in
maintaining family integrity. 161

157. See id. at 747 (“In deciding whether and where to incarcerate a mother
of young children, . . . it is appropriate for judges to take into account
the distance from home and visiting policies of the facility to which the
female offender is likely to be incarcerated.”).
158. See Hagan & Dinovitzer, supra note 155, at 146 (discussing studies
indicating that children of incarcerated parents are significantly more
likely to become incarcerated than their counterparts); Acoca & Raeder,
supra note 155, at 136 (contending that children of incarcerated parents
are “more likely to become victimizers of others”).
159. Patricia M. Wald, “What About the Kids?”: Parenting Issues in
Sentencing, 8 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 137, 138 (1995).
160. See Raeder, supra note 105, at 723–26; see also id. at 744–45 (noting
that incarceration may also reduce a woman’s chances of becoming
pregnant, and arguing that “women’s advocates should boldly attempt
to fashion [sentencing] arguments based on fundamental rights to
privacy, birth, and family, citing constitutional and policy
underpinnings for such a doctrine”).
161. Boudin, supra note 105, at 105–12.
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On the other side of the debate are those who argue that we
should hesitate to take children’s interests into account when
sentencing their parents. Professors Dan Markel, Jennifer Collins, and
Ethan Leib are prominent voices on this side of the debate. They
discuss parental incarceration in the context of their broader
argument that family status generally should not be taken into
account by the criminal law. 162 While recognizing the unfairness to
children of the harms inflicted by parental incarceration, they argue
that it is preferable to attend to children’s interests in these cases by
ameliorating prison policies 163 and addressing larger social inequalities
through distributive justice. 164 They recommend limiting consideration
of children’s interests at the sentencing of parents to a narrow set of
circumstances—namely, to those cases where children would suffer a
loss of “irreplaceable caregiving” upon a parent’s incarceration and
where it would be feasible, moreover, to defer the parent’s
incarceration. 165 These recommendations would arguably limit
consideration of children’s interests to an even greater extent than do
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 166
Markel, Collins, and Leib make both a principled argument and a
pragmatic one for limiting consideration of children’s interests at
parental sentencing. On the level of principle, they assert that taking
family ties into account in violates the principle of equal treatment
under the law by treating similarly situated defendants differently on
the basis of family status, 167 and thereby undermines the legitimacy of
the criminal justice system. 168 Their pragmatic argument is that
162. See Markel et al., supra note 3, at 49 (arguing that “ordinarily, a
defendant’s family ties and responsibilities should not serve as a basis
for a lighter sentence”).
163. See id. at 53–56 (arguing for greater consideration of family ties in the
penal system than at sentencing, for instance by considering “ease of
access for those who may facilitate [the prisoner’s] reentry (whether
family or friends) when making decisions regarding prison construction
or prison assignment after conviction”).
164. See id. at 50–51 (“Ordinarily, . . . we think that harms to innocent third
parties should be ameliorated through the institutions of distributive
justice, not criminal justice.”).
165. See id. at 51. Markel, Collins, and Leib recommend extending such
consideration not only to “those with a blood relationship or marriage,”
but to any third parties with whom a defendant has an “established
relationship of caregiving.” Id.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 126–31.
167. See Markel et al., supra note 3, at 31 (“[T]he principle of equality
should be a lodestar guiding our collective actions in the criminal justice
system.”).
168. See id. at 30 (“[The] principle of equality under the law . . . is a
prerequisite for a legitimate system of criminal justice.”); see also id.
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affording special treatment to parents might increase crime rates by
incentivizing parents to commit crimes. 169
As the debate currently stands, advocates of considering
children’s interests at sentencing have had difficulty persuading those
opposed to the practice to change their stance. 170 The popular
criminogenic argument for taking children’s interests into account—
that to do so would reduce crime rates by reducing the likelihood that
the children themselves will commit crimes later in life—is vulnerable
to the counterargument that letting parents off the hook could cut the
other way. More importantly, the criminogenic argument does not
address the objection that we need a principled basis for reducing
parents’ sentences and that, in the absence of one, we should not
sacrifice fairness for utility. It does not provide a satisfactory response
to the argument of Markel et al. and others that to take parental
status into account at sentencing violates the principle of equal justice
under the law and thereby undermines the legitimacy of criminal law.
A further problem with the current discussion concerning parental
incarceration is that this discussion remains relatively marginalized
within criminal law more generally. Much of the scholarly literature
concerning criminal responsibility and the justification for criminal
punishment does not merely fail to justify the harm that we inflict on
offenders’ children; it fails to confront the issue at all. A major
contribution of Markel, Collins, and Leib has been to provide a
comprehensive account of family status throughout criminal law, thus
bringing to the foreground an aspect of the field that a number of
criminal law scholars and philosophers have largely overlooked.
None of the arguments put forth in favor of considering parental
status sufficiently makes the case that doing so is not just consistent
with, but essential to, the underlying theoretical justifications of
criminal law. Where parental status has no bearing on a defendant’s
guilt, punishment, or rehabilitative potential, why should the criminal
law attend to the interests of his or her child? The notion of
preventing harm to helpless children is compelling, but those who
(“Unjustified disparities in sentence disposition or duration contribute to
the perception of the illegitimacy of the criminal justice system.”).
169. See id. at 32 (“[I]f sentencing policies serve to create a nonincarcerable
(or less carcerable) class of persons because these persons are
‘irreplaceable caregivers,’ then those persons will seek out criminal
endeavor or be, other things being equal, more sought after by others to
serve in criminal enterprises.”).
170. See, e.g., Myrna S. Raeder, Remember the Family: Seven Myths About
Single Parenting Departures, 13 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 251, 251 (2001) (“It
is disappointing to realize that nearly ten years have passed since I first
began writing about the sentencing guidelines’ shortsighted policy of
discouraging family ties as a basis for a departure, during which time
there has been no significant change in that policy.”).
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urge us to do so have yet to formulate a principled argument for why
criminal law should address children’s interests when sentencing
parents and how doing so can be consistent with criminal law’s
legitimacy.
This Article argues that a principled argument for taking
children’s interests into account—one consistent with the legitimacy
of criminal law—is available if we look beyond the confines of
criminal law to consider family law’s insights on the connection
between childhood and the adult self. These insights, in turn, bring
out the currently overlooked relationship between theories of criminal
responsibility, on the one hand, and our treatment of offenders’
children, on the other. 171 Family law thus helps to demonstrate that
the question of parental incarceration has greater bearing on the
underlying justifications of criminal law than has previously been
recognized.
B.

Contract Law

At the opposite end of the coerciveness spectrum from criminal
law—which can place a parent in prison—is contract law, which
enforces agreements freely entered into between private parties.
Regardless of how one stands on taking children’s interests into
account in criminal cases involving parents, it is irrefutable that the
decision to incarcerate a child’s parent can have profound and
harmful consequences for the child. Accordingly, despite resistance to
taking children’s interests into account, criminal law, as we have seen,
does provide for doing so in at least some instances. Within the
context of criminal law, then, courts and commentators are
accustomed to recognizing and articulating the connection between
the legal treatment of parents and the well-being of their children.
The effect on children of contract litigation involving their
parents is less obvious, and thus less often remarked upon. We
recognize that children are affected by contracts that involve them
directly, such as a contract reallocating parental rights. And contract
law also acknowledges that children are affected by contracts to which
they are parties. But there is virtually no discussion, by either courts
or commentators, of how children are affected by ordinary commercial
or consumer contracts involving private parties who happen to be
parents.
Yet when we approach ordinary parental contracts from family law’s
perspective on the myriad factors that can alter a child’s development,
we see that the enforcement of any private contract, insofar as it affects a
child’s parent, can affect the child as well, often profoundly. This Section
will discuss how children are potentially affected by contracts involving

171. See discussion infra Part III.A.
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their parents, and the extent to which the law takes children’s interests
into account when enforcing such contracts.
1.

How Contract Litigation Can Affect Nonparty Children

Any type of contract litigation can affect the children of parties to
the litigation. Contract law governs a wide range of transactions, such
as consumer credit agreements, large-scale commercial transactions,
and employment agreements, that can have significant financial as
well as other consequences for parties who happen to be parents.
Where parents are affected by the outcome of a contract dispute,
children may be as well.
Consider, for instance, a distributorship agreement giving a
parent exclusive rights to market a certain brand of shoes in a
geographical area. On signing the contract, the parent invests
extensive resources building and maintaining a store that sells only
that brand of shoes. Five years pass, and the shoe manufacturer
decides to provide the shoes to a major department store chain, which
will effectively put the parent’s shoe store out of business. The
contract is silent about when the exclusive distributorship ends, and
the court must determine whether the manufacturer is liable for the
damages caused by the termination. Consider the scenario in which,
should the court decide that the manufacturer has a right to
terminate the agreement without paying damages, the parent will
suffer catastrophic financial losses. Imagine that this will mean that
her family, including two young children, will lose their home, and
that the children will be taken out of their schools, where they have
been thriving.
As we have seen in the context of family law’s best-interests
analysis, any of these disruptions to a child’s life—financial hardship,
change of schools, and geographical relocation—can harm the child’s
development. 172 Family law courts try to avoid such disruptions on
the theory that they may diminish children’s future well-being and
their likelihood of becoming autonomous, productive, and happy
adults. 173 Should the court in our hypothetical take the potential
effects on children into account when enforcing the contract governing
the exclusive distributorship agreement? Should harm to children
affect the manufacturer’s right to terminate the agreement or the
damages awarded to the parent if the contract has indeed been
breached? No court or scholar to date has addressed such a
possibility.
The distributorship agreement affects children only remotely;
other parental contracts more directly influence children’s lives. At
one end of the influence spectrum are contracts that reallocate
172. See supra Part I.B.
173. See supra Part I.B.
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parental rights, such as surrogacy contracts and prenuptial custody
agreements. Children are clearly directly affected by contracts of
which they are the subject matter. Contracts in the middle of the
spectrum consist of those that relate to the child in some way, such as
agreements concerning children’s education and health insurance.
Toward the indirect end of the influence spectrum are contracts that
do not immediately concern the children, but affect them by affecting
their parents, such as contracts relating to employment, home
ownership, or consumer credit. At the far end of the spectrum are
agreements between commercial actors, such as the hypothetical
distributorship agreement discussed above, that are even further
removed from the parties’ children, but may have consequences for
them nonetheless. To what extent should courts take children’s
interests into account in these situations? When, if ever, should a
court treat a contract differently simply because one of the parties
happens to be a parent?
2.
a.

Current Judicial Approaches

The General Irrelevance of Parties’ Status as Parents

Under classical contract theory, the status of a contracting party as
the parent of a minor child is irrelevant. The premise of classical contract
theory—and of the revived forms of that theory, such as the notion of
contract as promise—is that the role of contract law is to enforce
whatever bargains parties make amongst themselves, instead of policing
and second guessing those bargains on the basis of each party’s status. 174
A contract is an arm’s-length bargain between two autonomous
individuals who freely consent to be bound to one another.175
Where a party cannot consent to an agreement—for instance, if,
at the time of contract formation, a party lacks capacity for full
rational choice because of infancy or other reasons, or lacks volition
because of duress—contract law will recognize this by finding that
there is no enforceable agreement. 176 Thus, when a child agrees to
174. Henry Maine famously claimed that freedom of contract had brought
about a shift “from Status to Contract.” Henry Sumner Maine,
Ancient Law 174 (10th ed. 1920) (1861).
175. See P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract
404–08 (1979) (providing a historical account of the rise of classical
contract theory, and of the notion that courts should enforce whatever
agreements the parties arrange amongst themselves instead of policing
the fairness of bargains). For recent revivals of the classical liberal
emphasis on autonomy and individual choice as the justification for
contract enforcement, see Charles Fried, Contract as Promise 16
(1981), and Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86
Colum. L. Rev. 269 (1986).
176. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 4.2 (4th ed. 2004)
(incapacity generally); id. § 4.4 (incapacity because of infancy); id.
§ 4.19 (duress).
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form a contract, special rules apply to limit the enforceability of the
agreement. 177 But as long as two parties capable of giving legal
consent have agreed to be bound by what would otherwise be an
enforceable contract, each party’s status is irrelevant, and a court will
not take either party’s familial obligations or other burdens into
account when enforcing the contract.
Contemporary theories of contract law have complicated and
contested the classical approach. Relational contract theory, for
instance, recognizes that parties to a long-term contract are not at
arm’s length, but instead are bound to one another by their contractual
relationship, and as such owe one another duties beyond those owed by
strangers engaged in discrete transactions. 178 In another strand of
contemporary contract theory, some ground contract law in concerns
about distributive justice 179 or fairness, 180 in a way that takes both
status and contractual context into account. Thus, some argue that
special rules should apply to contracts between certain types of parties,
such as landlords and tenants, in a way that recognizes the unequal
power between these groups, and shifts wealth from one to another. 181
Finally, scholars have noted, and much debated, the special treatment
afforded familial contracts, such as interspousal contracts for household
labor, 182 premarital agreements, 183 and contracts reallocating parental
177. See id. § 4.4 (contracts by infants enforceable only if for necessaries);
see also Larry Cunningham, A Question of Capacity: Towards a
Comprehensive and Consistent Vision of Children and Their Status
Under Law, 10 U.C. Davis J. Juv. L. & Pol’y 275, 287–94 (2006)
(contesting contract law’s construction of children’s incapacity).
178. For the foundational work on relational contract theory, see Ian R.
Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 Nw. U. L. Rev.
340 (1983), and Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges
and Queries, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 877 (2000).
179. See Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89
Yale L.J. 472 (1980); Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare
State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and
Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. Legal Stud.
283 (1995).
180. See James Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 Calif. L. Rev. 1587
(1981).
181. See Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92
Yale L.J. 763, 772 (1983) (justifying the nondisclaimable warranty of
habitability as “an instrument of redistribution that seeks to shift
control over housing from one group (landlords) to another (tenants)”).
182. See Hasday, supra note 2, at 499–507 (arguing that the law refuses to
enforce interspousal contracts for domestic services in order to signal the
special and intimate nature of spousal relationships); Reva B. Siegel,
The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives’ Rights
to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 Geo. L.J. 2127, 2130 (1994) (tracing the
early history of wives’ unsuccessful attempts to enforce interspousal
contracts for domestic services and characterizing this trend as
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rights and obligations. 184 It continues to be a premise of contract law,
however, that each party’s status outside the scope of the contractual
relationship—a party’s status as a woman or a mother, for instance, in
a contract for the sale of goods—is irrelevant to contract enforcement.
In short, whether a party to a contract has a child generally has
no bearing on how or whether the contract is enforced. The familial
status of the parties is relevant, if at all, only insofar as it has bearing
on the parties’ relationship to each other, and thus to the power
dynamic between them (for instance, under the doctrine of undue
influence, where the parties are spouses, this may impose heightened
duties of fairness on their contractual dealings) 185 or to the contract
itself (for instance, spouses are not always permitted to contractually
reconfigure their marital obligations). 186 With a few rare exceptions,
which this Article will now discuss, a contracting party’s parental
obligations are not seen as worthy of mention, let alone consideration,
by either scholars or courts.
b.

Exceptions

Contracts Reallocating Parental Rights. As a rule, courts will not
take children’s interests into account when adjudicating contracts
made by their parents. Courts adjudicating contract disputes will
rarely see fit even to acknowledge that a party to the contract is the
caretaker of a minor child. The primary exception to this rule occurs
transforming into the modern idiom of contract doctrine the statusbased notion that the husband owns his wife’s labor).
183. While a minority of states treat premarital agreements as ordinary
contracts, see, e.g., Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990), many
states police such agreements for both procedural and substantive
fairness, see, e.g., Blige v. Blige, 656 S.E.2d 822 (Ga. 2008). On the
other hand, slightly more than half of the states have adopted the
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA), under which, apart from
certain limited exceptions, premarital agreements are unenforceable only
if either they were not entered into voluntarily or they are both
procedurally unfair for lack of financial disclosure and substantively
unfair because they contain unconscionable terms. See Unif.
Premarital Agreement Act § 6 (2001). As many have noted, the
UPAA “appears to require a greater showing before invalidating an
agreement than would conventional contract law.” Brian Bix,
Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital
Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 145, 156 (1998) (summarizing current approaches to and scholarly
debate over enforcement of premarital agreements).
184. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.b.
185. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 177 (1981) (contract
unenforceable where parties with special relationships, such as spouses,
take advantage of those relationships to exercise unfair persuasion).
186. See supra note 183.
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when children are directly involved in the contract in question. The
paradigmatic instance of this is when a contract reallocates parental
rights. Here, where children are the subject matter of contractual
exchange, courts do acknowledge that children’s interests are at stake
and take those interests into account in determining whether and how
the contract should be enforced.
Thus, courts routinely consider children’s interests in determining
whether to enforce custody agreements between parents. 187 Courts will
typically refuse to enforce a custody agreement that is part of a
premarital contract, on the basis that such an agreement is likely to
have little relevance to a child’s interests. 188 The rule in most states is
that even a custody agreement reached at the time of separation or
divorce is enforceable only to the extent that it is consistent with the
child’s best interests. 189 Many of these states will consider the
agreement as a factor in assessing the child’s interests, 190 and some
will presume that those interests correspond with the agreement, 191

187. See Linda Jellum, Parents Know Best: Revising Our Approach to
Parental Custody Agreements, 65 Ohio St. L.J. 615 (2004) (arguing for
greater deference to parental custody agreements, and noting that the
majority of states give no deference to such agreements).
188. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Best, 901 N.E.2d 967, 970 (Ill. App. Ct.
2009) (“The law severely limits on public policy grounds the
enforceability of contracts affecting the custody and support of minor
children. Illinois law per se rejects premarital agreements that impair
child-support rights or specify custody.”).
189. See, e.g., Eickbush v. Eickbush, 171 P.3d 509, 511–12 (Wyo. 2007)
(“[C]ourts have a duty to disregard, if necessary, agreements entered
into by parents and to make provision for the proper support and care
of minor children according to their best interests. This obligation arises
because although the settlement agreement significantly impacts the
children, they are not parties to the contract nor are they typically
represented in the negotiation thereof.” (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Zahl v. Zahl, 736 N.W.2d 365, 368 (Neb.
2007) (holding that parental agreements do not control child custody
because the court must look to the children’s best interests); Brockman
v. Brockman (In re Marriage of Brockman), 240 Cal. Rptr. 96, 98–100
(Ct. App. 1987) (same).
190. See, e.g., Eschbach v. Eschbach, 436 N.E.2d 1260, 1263 (N.Y. 1982)
(“[N]o agreement of the parties can bind the court to a disposition other
than that which a weighing of all the factors involved shows to be in the
child’s best interests. Thus, an agreement between the parties is but one
factor to be weighed by the court in deciding whether a change of
custody is warranted.”) (citations and internal quotation mark
omitted)).
191. See, e.g., Keen v. Keen, 629 N.E.2d 938, 941–42 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that parents’ agreement as to custody must be given great
weight but cannot be enforced where court has clear basis for finding it
at odds with children’s best interests); Serr v. Serr, 746 N.W.2d 416, 419
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but under both approaches, the child’s best interests prevail. One
state, West Virginia, will enforce parenting arrangements agreed to by
separating or divorcing parents unless it is shown that doing so is
harmful to a child. 192 No state, then, will enforce a custody agreement
without taking the child’s interests into account to some extent. In
the arena of child custody, children’s interests predominate over the
usual rules of contract law.
Another type of agreement related to children is a contract by
which the parties agree to terminate, transfer, or take on parental
rights. This includes adoption agreements, which are regulated by
state statute and must be approved by judicial decree, 193 and
surrogacy agreements, which are increasingly regulated by statute as
well. 194 When a contract reallocating parental status has come before
(N.D. 2008) (holding that parents’ stipulation as to custody to be given
great deference but is not determinative).
192. See W. Va. Code Ann. § 48-9-201 (LexisNexis 2009) (requiring courts
to enforce parenting plans entered into voluntarily and knowingly unless
harmful to the child); cf. id. § 48-9-206 (providing that, where parents
cannot agree on such a plan, courts allocating custody should take into
account “any prior agreement of the parents” where “appropriate . . .
under the circumstances as a whole including the reasonable
expectations of the parents in the interest of the child”).
193. See Grossberg, supra note 69, at 268–80 (tracing the history of state
regulation of adoption, beginning with Massachusetts in 1851); Unif.
Adoption Act § 3-703 (1994) (requiring determination that adoption is
in child’s best interests in order for court to approve adoption petition,
even where biological parents have consented to the adoption); see also
Annette Ruth Appell, The Move Toward Legally Sanctioned
Cooperative Adoption: Can it Survive the Uniform Adoption Act?, 30
Fam. L.Q. 483 (1996) (describing need for greater enforcement of
agreements providing for post-adoption contact, and summarizing five
state statutes permitting such agreements with consent of the court).
But see Amanda C. Pustilnik, Note, Private Ordering, Legal Ordering,
and the Getting of Children: A Counterhistory of Adoption Law, 20
Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 263, 264 (2002) (setting forth a “counterhistory
[that] presents adoption practice and law as nonstatutory, with deep
private-ordering roots in contract law”).
194. A number of state statutes prohibit enforcement of surrogacy
agreements. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-218(A) (2011);
Mich. Comp. Laws § 722.855 (2012); N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 122
(McKinney 2010). Other states have enacted legislation imposing lesser
restrictions on surrogacy contracts, such as providing that they are
unenforceable when compensation is involved. See, e.g., Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 25-21,200 (2008); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 26.26.230, 26.26.240
(2010). Still other states have statutorily provided for enforcement of
surrogacy agreements in certain limited circumstances; in Virginia, for
instance, such agreements are enforceable if the intending parents and
the surrogate meet a number of requirements (including that the
intended mother is infertile or has medical reasons for not being able to
bear a child) and obtain judicial pre-conception approval of the
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courts in the absence of a clear statutory rule on the subject, the
response has often been to refuse to enforce the contract on public
policy grounds. 195 Thus, in the well-known Baby M case, the New
Jersey Supreme Court refused to enforce a surrogacy contract by
which a biological mother agreed to terminate her parental rights and
allow her child to be raised by the biological father and his wife. 196
While the court had several public-policy objections to the surrogacy
contract, it found that “worst of all” was “the contract’s total
disregard of the best interests of the child.” 197 Such an agreement, the
court found, was “based on . . . principles that are directly contrary
to the objectives of our laws,” because it allocated parental rights in a
manner that “totally ignore[d] the child.” 198 Other courts refusing to
enforce such agreements have similarly asserted that custody decisions
must be based, not on parental contracts, but on judicial assessment
of the child’s best interests. 199
When it comes to considerations of children’s interests in
contracts involving their parents, then, the law takes an all-or-nothing
approach. In the majority of cases, the fact that a parent has children
who may be affected by enforcement of the parent’s contract is
agreement. See Va. Code Ann. § 20-160 (Supp. 2012). But see id. § 20161 (directing court to vacate the order approving the agreement where
a genetically related surrogate decides to terminate the agreement
within 180 days of assisted conception). For a summary of current state
approaches to surrogacy, see Darra L. Hofman, “Momma’s Baby,
Daddy’s Maybe”: A State-by-State Survey of Surrogacy Laws and Their
Disparate Gender Impact, 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 449 (2009).
195. See, e.g., R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 796–97 (Mass. 1998) (refusing
to enforce traditional surrogacy contract); T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d
1244, 1251 (Mass. 2004) (refusing to enforce agreement to assume
parental rights and obligations, on the basis that “‘[p]arenthood by
contract’ is not the law in Massachusetts”). But cf. Johnson v. Calvert,
851 P.2d 776, 783 (Cal. 1993) (en banc) (finding that gestational
surrogacy agreement was not inconsistent with public policy and could
therefore be considered as evidence of intent to parent in order to
resolve dispute between birth mother and genetic mother, both of whom
fit the statutory definition of “natural mother”). For the early history of
courts’ refusal to enforce adoption contracts before a statutory
mechanism was in place to facilitate adoptions, see Abramowicz, supra
note 73.
196. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1237 (N.J. 1988) (finding that surrogacy
agreement conflicted both with public policy considerations and with
statutory provisions prohibiting compensation for adoption and making
consent to adoption revocable in private placement adoptions).
197. Id. at 1248.
198. Id. at 1250.
199. See R.R., 689 N.E.2d at 797 (“The mother and father may not . . .
make a binding best-interests-of-the-child determination by private
agreement.”).

339

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 2·2012
Beyond Family Law

treated as altogether irrelevant. Where a contract reallocates parental
rights, however, an entirely different set of rules applies. Contract law
drops away entirely, and family law takes over. 200 Contracts
reallocating parental rights are not enforced as contractual
obligations; instead, they become, at most, one factor a court can
consider in assessing the paramount concern of child custody law—the
best interests of the child.
Children and Negative Externalities. Contract theory does provide
a potential basis for taking children’s interests into account in cases
that affect them indirectly: the concept of negative externalities. A
negative externality is the harm a contract inflicts on third persons
who are not parties to the contract. 201 To take an extreme case, a
contract for murder would impose a negative externality on the
targeted victim, as well as on society at large, which is harmed by the
violation of its criminal laws. The law protects against such negative
externalities by holding such contracts illegal and unenforceable. 202
Another example is a noncompetition agreement that harms the
public by distorting market forces and restraining trade. Here, too,
the law will protect against these unwanted negative externalities by
limiting the enforcement of such contracts as against public policy. 203
200. Scholars continue to debate the differential treatment of contracts
reallocating parental rights, particularly in the wake of the new
permutations of parenthood permitted by assisted reproductive
technology. See, e.g., Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology
and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality,
1990 Wis. L. Rev. 297, 396–98 (arguing for enforcing such agreements
in the context of assisted reproductive technology, with protective
mechanisms to ensure disclosure and informed consent); Marsha
Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to
the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 835, 865
(2000) (arguing against the enforcement of such agreements, on the
basis that “our legal tradition precludes per se enforcement of all
contracts concerning children” and that there is no evidence that the
situation of assisted reproductive technology is sufficiently different to
justify inconsistent treatment).
201. As F.H. Buckley explains, “What I do affects others, for good or for ill,
and this may supply a reason to restrict bargaining freedom. The
economist’s assumption that a person will not agree to a contract which
leaves him worse off might have little traction when the costs are born
by an unwilling third party.” F.H. Buckley, Perfectionism, 13 Sup. Ct.
Econ. Rev. 133, 139 (2005).
202. See, e.g., McMahon v. Anderson, 728 A.2d 656, 658 (D.C. 1999)
(“[W]hen parties have entered into an illegal contract, such contract is
unenforceable.”); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 178 cmt. b
(1981) (“[W]hen an agreement involves a serious crime . . .
unenforceability is plain.”).
203. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 186(1) (1981) (“A
promise is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if it is unreasonably
in restraint of trade.”).
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According to those who explain contract law from an economic or
efficiency perspective, the goal of limiting negative externalities is
behind several features of contract law, 204 from the refusal to enforce
certain contracts on the basis of illegality or public policy to the
limitation of contractual freedom through mandatory default rules. 205
From an economic perspective, negative externalities render a
contract inefficient, 206 and thus militate against enforcement, 207 when
they impose costs on third parties that significantly outweigh the
benefits to both contracting parties. 208 Attention to negative
externalities is also mandated by the liberal, autonomy-based
approach to contract law, which holds that negative externalities form
a necessary limit to contractual freedom, because the right of
individual liberty, including freedom of contract, does not entail a
right to inflict harm on others. 209
204. See Margaret Friedlander Brinig, A Maternalistic Approach to
Surrogacy: Comment on Richard Epstein’s Surrogacy: The Case for Full
Contractual Enforcement, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2377, 2390 (1995)
(“According to economic analysis, contracts . . . become less than fully
enforceable where there are substantial negative third-party effects.”).
205. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87, 88–89 (1989)
(describing prevention of harm to third parties as one of the two
primary normative justifications for imposing immutable rules that limit
freedom of contract).
206. Economists speak of two types of efficiency, Pareto efficiency and
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. A transaction is Pareto efficient when it makes
at least one party better off, and makes no one worse off. A transaction
is Kaldor-Hicks efficient where it maximizes welfare in the aggregate, in
that, in a world with no transaction costs, the parties that benefit from
the transaction could pay off those that suffer from it. See Richard A.
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 12–13 (3d ed. 1986).
207. See Michael J. Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom of Contract
58–61 (1993) (explaining how refusals to enforce contracts on the basis
of negative externalities can be seen as consistent with the economic,
efficiency-based approach to legal analysis).
208. As many have noted, the question of when negative externalities are
sufficient to render a contract unenforceable raises a difficult problem of
line drawing. See Richard A. Epstein, Externalities Everywhere?: Morals
and the Police Power, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 61, 63 (1997)
(“Simply to point out that . . . externalities exist, however, is not to
demonstrate that they always exceed the private gains to the parties—
or even that the costs of preventing the external harms is smaller than
the harms themselves.”); Trebilcock, supra note 207, at 58 (“Almost
every transaction one can conceive of is likely to impose costs on third
parties.”).
209. See Trebilcock, supra note 207, at 61–64 (discussing the connection
between concern with externalities and the liberal theory of harm
promulgated by John Stuart Mill).
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Children are often considered relevant victims of externalities in
the context of familial contracts. Indeed, the concept of negative
externalities in the form of harm to children is held up as justifying
the limited enforceability of such contracts. For instance, a number of
scholars who oppose the enforcement of surrogacy contracts have
grounded their position in the notion that such contracts inflict
negative externalities on children, 210 such as conveying that they are
commodities 211 or allocating them to new parents without assessing
their interests. 212 Courts refusing to enforce surrogacy contracts, while
not using the term “negative externalities,” have used a similar
logic. 213 Children are also seen as victims of negative externalities in
connection with other contracts allocating parental rights, such as
custody agreements. 214 Some have argued that negative externalities
affecting children should likewise be considered in the context of the
enforcement of marital property agreements, even where these do not
directly touch upon the custody or care of the children themselves. 215
210. See Brinig, supra note 204, at 2381, 2384–85, 2391–92 (discussing the
third-party effects of surrogacy contracts on children, including the
surrogate’s other children, and concluding that such contracts should
not be enforced); see also Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for
Full Contractual Enforcement, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2305, 2320–23 (1995)
(acknowledging that children are relevant externalities in assessing the
enforceability of surrogate contracts, but concluding that the risk of
harm to children is not high enough to warrant a limit on the
enforcement of such contracts).
211. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev.
1849, 1928–29 (1987).
212. See Garrison, supra note 200, at 892–98 (arguing that there is no reason
to except surrogacy from the usual rule that contracts allocating
parental rights are void when at odds with a child’s best interests); Jana
B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 1443,
1555–56 (proposing that the trend toward privatization in family law,
including surrogacy contracts, be limited when children’s interests are at
stake); see also Judith Areen, Baby M Reconsidered, 76 Geo. L.J.
1741, 1747 (1988) (opposing enforcement of surrogacy contracts on the
basis, inter alia, that they put children at risk by increasing the
likelihood that they will be abandoned at birth).
213. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1246 (N.J. 1988) (finding surrogacy
contract unenforceable on the basis, inter alia, that it allocated custody
without determining the best interests of the child).
214. See Singer, supra note 212, at 1553 (raising possibility of “two-tiered”
system limiting private agreements regarding family relations when
children are involved).
215. See Carolyn J. Frantz, Should the Rules of Marital Property Be
Normative?, 2004 U. Chi. Legal F. 265, 282 (noting that harms to
children are currently considered relevant externalities in the rules
governing marital property division); see also Elizabeth S. Scott,
Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 Va. L. Rev.
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Any contract that adversely affects children could be
characterized as inflicting a negative externality. This includes
contracts that do not concern either the children themselves or the
structure of their family, such as a commercial or consumer contract
to which a parent is a party. If the terms of the commercial or
consumer contract are adverse to the parent, such that enforcement
will cause significant economic distress, then they are likely to be
adverse to the child as well, insofar as children’s fortunes typically
follow those of their parents. As with any negative externality, there
may be good reasons not to take harm to children into account. But
it seems undeniable that harms to children are potential negative
externalities to many types of contracts involving their parents.
Neither courts nor theorists, however, have considered children
relevant victims of negative externalities in non-familial contracts
involving their parents. While harms to children are often considered
in connection with contracts that reconfigure the family, children are
typically absent from discussions of parental contracts that have no
direct connection to family matters, such as ordinary commercial or
consumer contracts. Despite the potential harms that such contracts
may inflict on the children of the parties who form them, there is
currently little or no analysis of such harms either in the case law or
in the scholarly literature on negative externalities in contract law.
Unconscionability. While not typically framed as such, the
doctrine of unconscionability provides another possible mechanism for
courts to take children’s interests into account in enforcing contracts
that affect them indirectly. Unconscionability has both a substantive
and a procedural aspect. Courts may refuse to enforce a contract if
either its terms (substantive unconscionability) or the bargaining
process (procedural unconscionability) are so unfair as to suggest that
no meaningful choice was exercised in the formation of the contract. 216
A court refusing to enforce a contract on the basis of
unconscionability often points to a combination of substantive and
procedural unconscionability, such as an inequality of bargaining
power that produces unreasonably oppressive contractual terms. 217
9, 87–91 (1990) (advocating that divorce be made more difficult to
obtain when children are involved).
216. See Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s
New Clause, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485, 488 (1967) (formulating the
distinction between procedural and substantive unconscionability).
217. See Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of
Unconscionability: An Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 Fla. St.
U. L. Rev. 1067, 1074–76, 1098 (2006) (demonstrating through
empirical study that while courts often articulate a need for both a
substantive and a procedural element to render a contract unenforceable
on the basis of unconscionability, substantive unconscionability alone
can also, in practice, suffice).
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Unconscionability is measured at the time the contract is formed, and
hence typically requires overreaching by the dominant party. 218
There is no suggestion in the contracts literature that
unconscionability applies, in particular, to contracts involving parties
with minor children. But unconscionability doctrine gives courts
leeway to take a party’s situation—including parental obligations—
into account in assessing the unfairness of the bargaining process and
of contractual terms. Thus, in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co., the most well-known case on unconscionability doctrine, the
court seemed to take a consumer’s status as a mother into account in
assessing the fairness of her contract with a retail furniture store. 219
The contract between Mrs. Williams and the Walker-Thomas
Furniture Company provided for an installment payment plan
whereby the store could repossess everything Mrs. Williams purchased
over several years if she defaulted on a payment for any one item. In
condemning the store for contract terms that it saw as “unreasonably
favorable” 220 to the seller, the court noted, in particular, that the store
sold Mrs. Williams a $514 stereo set on this plan, even though it knew
that she still owed a balance on previously purchased furniture, and
that she lived on a welfare check of $218 per month and “had to feed,
clothe and support both herself and seven children on this amount.” 221
The Williams court did not expressly articulate a doctrine under
which courts will assess unconscionability by looking to the effects on
a party’s minor children of enforcing the terms of a contract. But the
court did treat Mrs. Williams’s status as a mother of seven children—
and the store’s awareness of this status—as relevant to its assessment
of both the behavior of the store and the fairness of the contract
terms. The Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, the court appeared
to suggest, should have refrained from allowing someone so financially
constrained, and with seven dependents, to enter into such an
unfavorable arrangement, particularly for a nonnecessity such as a
stereo. 222 In assessing the unfairness of the repossession arrangement,

218. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (2012) (court may refuse to enforce contract if
unconscionable at time it was made).
219. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965).
220. Id. at 449.
221. Id. at 448 (quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d
914, 916 (D.C. 1964)).
222. See id. (“The reverse side of the stereo contract listed the name of
appellant’s social worker and her $218 monthly stipend from the
government. Nevertheless, with full knowledge that appellant had to
feed, clothe and support both herself and seven children on this amount,
appellee sold her a $514 stereo set.” (quoting Williams v. WalkerThomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914, 916 (D.C. 1964))); see also id. at
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moreover, the court seemed to consider the harm that enforcement
would inflict on the seven children of this single mother. The
implication is that courts can wield the unconscionability doctrine to
encourage contracting parties to take special care not to exploit
economically vulnerable parties with dependent children.
While Williams seemingly enables courts to take parental status
into account in assessing unconscionability, no commentator frames
the case as extending unconscionability to contract disputes where
children’s interests are at stake. The fact that the Williams plaintiff
had seven children is frequently mentioned in accounts of the case. 223
But the bearing of the case on children as a general matter is rarely
raised in discussions of Williams and its progeny. 224 Despite the
mention of children in Williams, neither courts nor commentators
explicitly frame unconscionability doctrine as potentially taking
children’s interests into account in contracts involving their parents.
3.

Arguments About Considering Children’s Interests

Throughout most of contract law, children are invisible. They are
taken into account in exceptional situations involving custody
agreements, for instance, or contracts by children themselves. In such
cases, the usual rules of contract law do not apply, and family-law
principles or paternalism take over instead. But when it comes to
ordinary contract disputes, courts and contract theorists rarely
contemplate the possibility that children’s interests could be taken
into account in enforcing contracts involving their parents.
To the extent that commentators have touched upon the effect on
children of the law that regulates their parents’ nonfamilial contracts,
they have done so obliquely. An example is the attention to children
in recent discussions of mortgage and foreclosure law, which, while it
rests upon contractual arrangements, is more heavily regulated than
contract law generally, and thus would seem more amenable to taking
children’s interests into account. 225 The current financial crisis has
450 (Danaher, J., dissenting) (“What is a luxury to some may seem an
outright necessity to others.”).
223. See, e.g., Leff, supra note 216, at 555 (noting that the Walker-Thomas
Company knew that Mrs. Williams had seven children).
224. A typically brief and undeveloped mention of children in connection
with the Williams case occurs in Arthur Leff’s seminal article on
unconscionability doctrine. Leff criticizes the application of the doctrine
in Williams as “sneakily” working to achieve goals that no legislature
would openly admit to, such as the goal of “foster[ing] in the deserving
poor” the “traditional middle-class virtues of thrift and child care.” Id.
at 558.
225. See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act of 1968, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667 (2006)
(mandating certain disclosures from lenders to home buyers); see
generally Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure:
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made clear that children are affected, often deeply so, when a bank
forecloses on the family home or evicts a family because it has
foreclosed on the landlord. In the recent furor over the foreclosure
crisis, both politicians and the media have focused on harm to families
from foreclosure on their homes, and have spoken in particular about
harm to children. 226
Despite the attention to the harms inflicted on children by the
financial crisis, there is little discussion by lawmakers or legal scholars
of the possibility that foreclosure law treat parties differently on the
basis that they are the parents of minor children. When lawmakers
have confronted the foreclosure crisis, despite the rhetoric of saving
“families,” they have for the most part protected homeowners and
renters generally, as opposed to singling out those with minor children
or other dependents. 227 Only a few scattered municipalities have
enacted ordinances requiring special treatment of foreclosure evictions
where children are involved; one example is San Francisco, which
recently enacted legislation prohibiting owner move-in evictions
during the school year where households include children under the
age of eighteen. 228
The primary area in which parties with children may be treated
differently in the context of foreclosure evictions is in the practical
application of laws that are facially neutral with respect to children.
Thus, a family with children may be given protective treatment by a
court setting an eviction date, or overseeing the renegotiation of a
mortgage contract. And in some instances, the sheriff charged with
executing an eviction order may hesitate where young children are
involved. Thus, for instance, in late 2008, Thomas J. Dart, the sheriff
of Cook County, Illinois, suspended all foreclosure evictions,
The Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 Duke L.J. 1399 (2004)
(discussing history of state and federal regulation of foreclosures).
226. See, e.g., Stephanie Armour, Foreclosures’ Financial Strains Take Toll on
Kids, USA Today, July 9, 2008, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/
economy/housing/2008-07-08-children-foreclosure-homeless_N.htm.
227. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Mayor, City of Providence, R.I.,
New Hope for Homeowners & Tenants Facing Foreclosure (Aug. 7,
2009), available at http://cityof.providenceri.com/NewsReleaseArchive/
article.php?id=545 (quoting mayor as explaining that city foreclosure
ordinance, which protects tenants and homeowners regardless of family
status, was intended to “protect families from the impact of a
nationwide foreclosure crisis that has devastated too many families in
our neighborhoods”).
228. See S.F. Admin. Code § 37.9(j)(1) (2011) (“It shall be a defense to an
eviction . . . if any tenant in the rental unit has a custodial or family
relationship with a child under the age of 18 who is residing in the unit,
the tenant with the custodial or family relationship has resided in the
unit for 12 months or more, and the effective date of the notice of
termination of tenancy falls during the school year.”).
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describing the experience of “seeing little children put out on the
street with their possessions” as “gut-wrenching.” 229 But such
exceptions are rare and are at odds with the applicable law.
Federal lawmakers have not ignored the plight of children
altogether. But their efforts to help children have been directed either
at all victims of foreclosure or at situations not directly connected to
contracts and foreclosure law, such as education funding. Thus, for
instance, initial legislation on the current foreclosure and housing
crisis—the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 230—included
a provision directing federal funds to educational institutions able to
provide assistance to children who became homeless as a result of
foreclosure of the family home or eviction from foreclosed rental
properties. 231 Insofar as it directly regulates foreclosure, however, this
same legislation does not treat families with children differently from
other homeowners and renters.
A similar pattern occurs in the context of bankruptcy law.
Bankruptcy law does not, for the most part, take into account
whether parties have dependent children when determining whether
to permit a discharge in bankruptcy. 232 Nevertheless, one of the
rationales for extending the right to a discharge in bankruptcy, and
for contract law’s refusal to enforce a waiver of that right, 233 is that
bankruptcy provides protection to a debtor’s dependents, including
children. Contracts scholar Charles Fried has noted that the right to
229. John Leland, Sheriff in Chicago Ends Evictions in Foreclosures, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 8, 2008, at A14.
230. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122
Stat. 2654.
231. See 42 U.S.C. § 11432(h)(1) (Supp. IV 2011) (funding educational
activities for children and youth who have become homeless as a result
of foreclosure).
232. For the most prominent exception, see 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2006),
which allows the discharge of student loan debt on the basis of “undue
hardship on the debtor and the debtor’s dependents.” A debtor’s status
as the parent of minor children is also relevant, albeit indirectly, to
whether the debtor can file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. A debtor can be
precluded from Chapter 7 bankruptcy if his or her monthly income,
minus certain reasonable or actual monthly expenses, exceeds a certain
amount. See id. § 707. In calculating the debtor’s expenses, courts are
directed to consider certain expenses for dependents, including
dependent children. See id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV). Here, the goal of
considering the debtor’s parental status seems not to protect children
from hardship, but to determine with accuracy the debtor’s reasonable
expenses.
233. See John M. Czarnetzky, The Individual and Failure: A Theory of the
Bankruptcy Discharge, 32 Ariz. St. L.J. 393, 449–50 (2000) (noting
that prepetition waiver of the right to discharge in bankruptcy is
unenforceable, even if knowing and voluntary on the part of the debtor).
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a discharge in bankruptcy ensures that “no matter what a man’s
contractual obligations, he will not be disabled from supporting
himself and his family at some reasonable level.” 234 But the reference
to children is here, as typically, oblique, folded within the more
general category of “family” or “dependents.” 235 There is no suggestion
that the protections of bankruptcy should be made more readily
available when children’s interests are at stake. And despite the
general sense that bankruptcy law serves to protect dependents, there
is very little discussion of the reasons for protecting children in
particular, who—as bankruptcy expert Thomas Jackson conceded in a
rare, and footnoted, exception to the scholarly tendency to overlook
the issues of children and the distinct set of problems that they
pose—cannot themselves negotiate with a caretaking adult to protect
their interests when making credit decisions. 236
While bankruptcy law does not consider children’s interests in
determining whether to extend its protections in the first instance, 237
there are a number of ways in which the operation of bankruptcy law
does countenance, and to some extent protect, the needs of children.
For instance, bankruptcy law protects child and parent creditors by
providing that domestic support obligations are not dischargeable in
bankruptcy. 238 Children are also protected by homestead exemption
laws, 239 which protect children by keeping the family home—or some
234. Fried, supra note 175, at 108.
235. See also, e.g., Conrad K. Cyr, Setting the Record Straight for a
Comprehensive Revision of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 49 Am. Bankr.
L.J. 99, 150–52 (1975) (advocating reforms to consumer bankruptcy law
in order to better protect “young families” from “economic collapse”);
Richard E. Flint, Bankruptcy Policy: Toward a Moral Justification for
Financial Rehabilitation of the Consumer Debtor, 48 Wash. & Lee L.
Rev. 515, 537 (1991) (characterizing bankruptcy law as driven by the
notion that “[t]he family unit should not suffer the consequences of
financial mistakes in which it did not directly participate”).
236. See Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98
Harv. L. Rev. 1393, 1419 n.82 (1985) (excepting children from the
argument that dependents are generally well-positioned to ensure that
the people they depend on for support consider their interests when
making credit decisions).
237. A prominent exception to this is the discharge of student loan debt,
which is available upon a showing of undue hardship to a debtor and
the debtor’s dependents. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2006).
238. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (2006); see also Kristin Brandser Kalsem,
Bankruptcy Reform and the Financial Well-Being of Women: How
Intersectionality Matters in Money Matters, 71 Brook. L. Rev. 1181,
1202–10 (2006) (discussing legislative concern with protecting women
and children who are owed spousal and child support by debtors filing
for bankruptcy).
239. See Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal
Mythology of Home, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1093, 1100–01, 1115–18 (2009)
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portion of its value—out of the reach of creditors. 240 Traditionally, the
homestead exemption was available only to heads of families, which
was often interpreted as requiring that the debtor claiming the
exemption had dependents in need of support. 241 Today, while most
jurisdictions provide a homestead exemption to all individuals, 242 a few
limit homestead protections to those with dependents, 243 and others
provide greater protections (typically, a greater exemption amount) for
those with dependents. 244 The homestead exemption laws thus seem
designed, in part, to protect children from the financial vicissitudes of
their parents.
Children are also taken into account in the formulas by which
bankruptcy law calculates how much income certain debtors should
be able to exempt from repayment in order to fulfill their basic needs.
Thus, a debtor who files for Chapter 13 bankruptcy is required, when
a trustee or unsecured creditor objects to confirmation of a proposed
bankruptcy plan, to comply with a requirement that all of the
“debtor’s projected disposable income” be devoted to paying

(describing homestead exemption laws and noting that they are often
justified as protecting children from dislocation, while disputing as an
empirical matter that children suffer psychological harm when parents
lose their homes).
240. Some states protect the family home in its entirety from the reach of
creditors. See, e.g., Fla. Const. art. 10, § 4. But others protect as little
as $5,000 of the value of the family home. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 6-10-2
(LexisNexis 2005) (limiting homestead exemption to $5,000); W. Va.
Code Ann. § 38-9-1 (LexisNexis 2011) (same).
241. See Alison D. Morantz, There’s No Place Like Home: Homestead
Exemption and Judicial Constructions of Family in Nineteenth-Century
America, 24 Law & Hist. Rev. 245, 245 (2006) (discussing changing
judicial interpretation of head of family status in the context of
nineteenth-century homestead exemption laws).
242. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 6-10-2 (LexisNexis 2005) (“The homestead of
every resident of this state, with the improvements and appurtenances,
not exceeding in value $5,000 and in area 160 acres, shall be . . . exempt
from levy and sale under execution or other process for the collection of
debts during his or her life and occupancy . . . .”).
243. See, e.g., W. Va. Code Ann. § 38-9-1 (LexisNexis 2011) (“Any
husband, wife, parent or other head of a household residing in this State
. . . owning a homestead shall by operation of law have a homestead
exemption . . . .”).
244. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 704.730 (West Supp. 2012)
(providing homestead exemption in the amount of $75,000, but raising
exemption to $100,000 where either debtor or debtor’s spouse is a
member of a “family unit”); id. § 704.710(b)(2) (West 2009) (defining
“family unit” as including the debtor along with a minor child that the
debtor or the debtor’s spouse “cares for or maintains in the
homestead”).
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unsecured creditors under the plan. 245 In calculating the projected
disposable income of a debtor, the court will deduct expenses that are
“reasonably necessary” for “the maintenance or support of the debtor
or a dependent of the debtor,” 246 and in so doing will consider factors
such as special circumstances giving rise to the need for a debtor’s
child to have a private-school education. 247 Here, however, it is not
clear that bankruptcy law sets out to protect children, so much as to
obtain an accurate calculation of each debtor’s reasonable expenses.
Moreover, recent changes in bankruptcy law have tightened the
restrictions on the child-related expenses that certain parent-debtors
can exempt from their projected disposable income under the rubric of
“reasonably necessary” expenses. Where a debtor has an abovemedian income, courts must now calculate the debtor’s projected
disposable income under a formula that, rather than allow courts to
determine, as formerly, the expenses that are reasonably necessary for
any given child, 248 limits exemption for children’s private school
expenses, for instance, to $1,775 per year. 249
Some have recently begun to advocate that bankruptcy law address
more directly the plight of debtors with dependent children. 250 Most
245. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b).
246. § 1325(b)(2)(A)(i).
247. See, e.g., In re Webb, 262 B.R. 685, 687, 690–91 (Bankr. E.D. Texas
2001) (holding that $550 per month to pay for private school was a
reasonably necessary expense, given the child’s special needs).
248. See id.
249. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(3) (2006) (directing that amounts “reasonably
necessary to be expended” under § 1325(b)(2)(A)(i) be determined in
accordance with § 707(b)(2) if the debtor’s income is greater than the
median income of the applicable state); id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV)
(“[D]ebtor’s monthly expenses may include the actual expenses for each
dependent child less than 18 years of age, not to exceed $1,775 per year
per child, to attend a private or public elementary or secondary school if
the debtor provides documentation of such expenses and a detailed
explanation of why such expenses are reasonable and necessary . . . .”).
250. See, e.g., Eric S. Nguyen, Parents in Financial Crisis: Fighting to Keep
the Family Home, 82 Am. Bankr. L.J. 229 (2008) (providing empirical
evidence that parents are more likely than childless debtors to file for
bankruptcy in order to save their homes, and arguing that bankruptcy
law should enable courts to provide heightened homeownership
protection to debtors with children); Elizabeth Warren, The New
Economics of the American Family, 12 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 1,
27–37 (2004) (arguing for changes to bankruptcy law to better address
the increasing financial distress of middle class families with children).
Some have also made the related argument that consumer credit
regulation fails to sufficiently protect children from the harm that
accompanies their parents’ financial distress, and should be reformed
accordingly. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making
Credit Safer, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 58–61 (2008).

350

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 2·2012
Beyond Family Law

prominently, Elizabeth Warren has shown that families with children
are significantly more likely to go into bankruptcy than other families,
and contends that this is because those with children bear greater
economic risks than their childless counterparts. 251 Warren argues that
we should consider how bankruptcy law might better protect children
from the financial distress of their parents, for instance by imposing
greater limits on creditors who attempt to repossess family homes or
cars. 252 As Warren observes, “the bankruptcy system offers a vision
deep into our collective values,” including our valuation of families and
of child rearing. 253
But Warren’s attention to children’s interests is the exception
rather than the rule. Even this exceptional attention to children’s
interests, moreover, tends to be limited to certain heavily regulated
areas of law that overlap with contract law, such as foreclosure law
and bankruptcy. In more general scholarly discussions of the limits of
contract enforcement, while there is extensive commentary on the
relevance of children’s interests to the enforceability of agreements
that affect them directly, such as surrogacy contracts, there is no
mention of even the possibility that children’s interests be taken into
account when enforcing contracts by their parents that have no direct
bearing on the children, but might well affect their lives nonetheless.

III. The Autonomy-Developing Rationale Across the
Legal Canon
Currently, the arguments for taking children’s interests into
account in cases involving their parents—to the extent that scholars
recognize the issue at all—have reached a stalemate. Framed within
the confines of each doctrinal field, these debates are either overly
narrow, as in contract law’s limited understanding of which
agreements affect children, or undertheorized, as in the parental
incarceration debate within criminal law. Moreover, the issue of
children’s interests is largely marginalized within each field, and
receives little attention in general scholarly accounts of each field’s
underlying rationale. No scholar has recognized the connection
between the law’s treatment of a child’s parents, on the one hand,
and, on the other, how each doctrinal area will treat the child upon
reaching adulthood—a connection that makes children’s interests an
essential component of any discussion of each field’s legitimacy.
This Article reframes the issue of children’s interests in cases
involving their parents—and argues for the central importance of
251. Elizabeth Warren, Bankrupt Children, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 1003, 1010–14,
1020–22 (2002).
252. Id. at 1024.
253. Id. at 1025.
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these interests across the legal canon—by importing into the
discussion the perspective of family law about why and how childhood
matters. Family law’s insight about the influence of childhood on the
adult self has shown, in Parts I and II, the extent to which children’s
development can be affected by cases involving their parents. The
Article now brings this insight to bear on the related question of why
we should take children’s interests into account in these cases. When
viewed in light of the formative influence of childhood experience,
children’s interests can be seen as integral to—rather than collateral
to—the two exemplary areas of law we are examining, criminal law
and contract law. As this Article will now demonstrate, both of these
areas of law are premised on a model of the adult legal subject that is
closely intertwined with the conditions of each child’s development.
This is the model of the adult legal actor as sufficiently autonomous,
in the sense of both rational and free, to be held responsible for his or
her actions.
From the perspective of the autonomy assumption, considering
the effect on children of legal decisions involving their parents no
longer seems at odds with the overarching concerns of criminal law,
contract law, or many of the other doctrinal areas of law in which
children’s interests are indirectly at stake. For according to family
law’s best-interests-of-the-child assessment, the likelihood that each
child will actually develop into a rational and independent adult—and
thus will resemble the model of the autonomous legal actor taken for
granted across the legal canon—is greatly influenced by the conditions
of each child’s upbringing and early experience. Thus, attending to
children’s interests in cases that affect them indirectly can be seen as
contributing to the legitimacy and internal consistency of any area of
law that predicates responsibility on adult autonomy. Considering
how legal outcomes affect children’s upbringing will enhance the
legitimacy of these areas of law by increasing the likelihood that the
children will grow up to resemble what the law will later assume them
to be—autonomous adults capable of acting rationally and exercising
freedom of choice.
A.

The Autonomy Premise in Criminal Law

A central debate in criminal law is the degree of autonomy that a
person must possess in order to be held responsible for his or her
actions. Because criminal law brings the power of the state to bear on
individuals more severely than any other area of law, legal
philosophers are especially concerned that individuals not be held
criminally liable unless they can be blamed for their actions. 254
254. See Richard C. Boldt, The Construction of Responsibility in the
Criminal Law, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2245, 2280 (1992) (discussing the
connection between blame and criminal punishment, and noting that
“[t]he criminal law is the most visible and explicit institutional setting
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Despite disagreement about the proper basis of criminal punishment,
there is a widespread consensus that blameworthy conduct requires a
minimal degree of autonomy, in the form of both rationality and
freedom of choice. 255 In the formulation of H.L.A. Hart, in order to be
held criminally responsible, a legal actor must possess both the
capacity (rationality) and the opportunity (freedom of choice) to
conform her behavior to the law. 256
This twofold requirement for criminal responsibility is reflected in
the substantive provisions of criminal law, which are predicated on a
minimal degree of autonomy in the form of rationality and freedom of
choice. Criminal liability typically requires both a mens rea (culpable
state of mind) 257 and an actus reus (a voluntary act or omission). 258
The mens rea component emphasizes that criminal responsibility
requires a degree of rational choice. If a legal actor is unaware of the
facts that made his actions unlawful, for instance, he may lack the
requisite mens rea. 259 The higher the degree of rational activity, the
more culpable a person may be for the same underlying conduct. It is
for this reason that premeditation, deliberation, and intent have
traditionally distinguished first-degree murder from lesser charges. 260
for the working out of questions of individual responsibility”); Joshua
Dressler, Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New
Excuses and the Model Penal Code, 19 Rutgers L.J. 671, 681 (1988)
(“[T]he criminal law is premised on the belief that wrongdoers should
not be punished in the absence of moral desert.”); Lloyd L. Weinreb,
Desert, Punishment, and Criminal Responsibility, 49 Law & Contemp.
Probs., Summer 1986, at 47, 79 (“Punishment follows directly from
desert because only if desert is fulfilled can we be regarded fully as
persons—free, morally responsible, and deserving—at all.”).
255. See Abramowicz, supra note 145, at 843–46 (summarizing debates about
the nexus between autonomy and criminal responsibility).
256. See H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility 181 (1968).
257. See Model Penal Code § 2.02(1) (1985) (“Except as provided in
Section 2.05, a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted
purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require,
with respect to each material element of the offense.”).
258. See id. § 2.01(1) (“A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability
is based on conduct that includes a voluntary act or the omission to
perform an act of which he is physically capable.”).
259. See Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 Calif. L. Rev.
1091, 1107 (1985) (“Ignorance . . . should be regarded as . . . the
negation of these forms of mens rea.”).
260. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 189 (Deering Supp. 2012) (defining
murder in the first degree as including “willful, deliberate, and
premeditated killing”); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-303 (2008) (“A person
commits murder in the first degree if he or she kills another person . . .
purposely and with deliberate and premeditated malice . . . .”). But see
2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 14.1(a) (2d ed.
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The actus reus requirement adds to this the mandate that conduct be
volitional if it is to become the basis for criminal responsibility. There
is no actus reus, and therefore no crime, for instance, where conduct is
the result of an involuntary spasm, or where the actor is
unconscious. 261
Criminal law’s twofold autonomy requirement is also reflected in
the major excuses from criminal liability, such as insanity and
duress. 262 The insanity defense makes sufficient rationality a
prerequisite to criminal responsibility. Under every version of the
insanity defense, an actor is excused if he lacked the capacity to
understand either the nature or the wrongfulness of his actions. 263 The
duress excuse, in turn, conveys that criminal responsibility requires a
certain degree of free choice. 264 A person who acts with a gun to his
head is not responsible because he did not act with sufficient freedom:
he had some volition, but his range of choices—obey the gunman or
face death—was too limited to merit criminal liability.
Even as criminal law mandates autonomy as the basis for criminal
responsibility, however, legal philosophers have long acknowledged
that we often hold actors legally responsible for their conduct in the
absence of full autonomy. On the one hand, the legitimacy of criminal
law rests on the assumption that we only inflict punishment on those
who acted with sufficient autonomy to merit blame for their actions.
At the same time, however, criminal law presumes that all minimally
competent adults meet this standard of autonomy. In the process, we
hold liable a number of adults whose rational capacity and freedom of
choice are significantly impaired.
This wrinkle in criminal law’s autonomy requirement is visible in
the debate over an excuse for criminal behavior that has been widely
rejected by courts and scholars: the “Rotten Social Background”
excuse. In the 1970s, Professor Richard Delgado, building upon the
work of Judge David Bazelon, proposed that we excuse from criminal
liability those who have been brought up in conditions that have
diminished their capacity to deliberate rationally and to regulate their
2003) (describing shift away from requiring premeditation as an element
of murder).
261. See Model Penal Code § 2.01(2)(a) (listing types of acts that are not
“voluntary” within the meaning of the “voluntary act” requirement for
criminal liability); see also Markus D. Dubber, Legitimating Penal Law,
28 Cardozo L. Rev. 2597, 2609 (2007) (linking both mens rea and
actus reus requirements to criminal law’s insistence on autonomy as a
prerequisite for criminal responsibility).
262. See 2 LaFave, supra note 260, § 9.1(a)(4) (discussing excuses from
criminal liability).
263. See 1 id. § 7.1 (discussing insanity defense).
264. See 2 id. § 9.7 (discussing the defense of duress).
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emotions. 265 The proposed “Rotten Social Background” defense
concerned adults who met the minimum standard of capacity that
rendered them liable under criminal law—they understood the nature
of their actions, and acted with a degree of volition—but who had
experienced a difficult childhood that led to significant difficulty in
conforming their behavior to the law. 266 Such a defendant, Delgado
argued, should not bear responsibility for actions that resulted from
an early upbringing and environment that had been inflicted on him
through no fault of his own. 267
Most criminal law scholars and legal philosophers reject the
prospect of a “Rotten Social Background” excuse even while
acknowledging that upbringing and early experience can diminish a
legal actor’s ability to avoid wrongdoing. 268 These scholars recognize
that childhood background can impair the two elements of autonomy,
rationality and self-control, and in so doing can lead adult actors to
engage in conduct that they might have avoided had they been raised
in a different environment. 269 But they argue that as long as adult

265. See Richard Delgado, “Rotten Social Background”: Should the Criminal
Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 Law
& Ineq. 9 (1985); United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 959–60
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting in part) (finding that trial
court improperly instructed jury on testimony concerning defendant’s
“rotten social background,” where expert testified that this background
made it difficult for defendant to control his conduct, and the judge
instructed the jury that “[w]e are not concerned with a question of
whether or not a man had a rotten social background” but only with
whether defendant was mentally ill); David L. Bazelon, The Morality of
Criminal Law, 49 S. Cal. L. Rev. 385, 388 (1976) (arguing that we
should not convict those who engage in proscribed conduct unless
“society’s own conduct in relation to the actor entitles it to sit in
condemnation of him with respect to the condemnable act” (footnote
omitted)).
266. See Delgado, supra note 265, at 65; Alexander, 471 F.2d at 960 (“The
thrust of [the defendant’s] defense was that the environment in which he
was raised—his ‘rotten social background’—conditioned him to respond
to certain stimuli in a manner most of us would consider flagrantly
inappropriate.”).
267. See Delgado, supra note 265, at 54 (“In some cases, a defendant’s
impoverished background so greatly determines his or her criminal
behavior that we feel it unfair to punish the individual.”).
268. See Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated
Review, 87 Calif. L. Rev. 943, 961 (1999) (describing widespread
rejection of the proposed “Rotten Social Background” defense).
269. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 259, at 1130–31 (recognizing that criminal
conduct can be caused by character traits created by upbringing and
early environment); Samuel H. Pillsbury, The Meaning of Deserved
Punishment: An Essay on Choice, Character, and Responsibility, 67
Ind. L.J. 719, 720 (1992) (criminal responsibility should not depend
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actors meet a minimal standard of capacity 270—such as possessing the
ability to understand the nature and wrongfulness of their actions,
which in most jurisdictions establishes legal sanity—we should act on
the premise that adults are autonomous, and hold them responsible
accordingly, instead of assessing the extent to which they fall short of
actual autonomy. 271
There are a number of reasons for criminal law to treat adults as if
they are autonomous, even when they are not. As a pragmatic matter,
once we begin excusing adults from liability on the basis that their
capacity to refrain from wrongdoing has been diminished by experiences
beyond their control, we open up the argument that no one can be held
responsible for his or her actions, because all of us are determined by
some combination of genetics and environment. 272 Another argument is
that recognizing the extent to which certain sane adults fall short of full
autonomy would diminish the dignity of those adults, 273 with
potentially pernicious results: were we to treat certain adults as
children who cannot control their actions, their rights and liberties
could be curtailed accordingly. 274 Still others argue that we must treat
adults as autonomous because the assumption of adult autonomy is
upon whether unchosen influences diminished a legal actor’s ability to
“freely choose” to engage in criminal conduct).
270. See Moore, supra note 259, at 1149 (arguing that a minimal ability to
engage in “practical reasoning” should suffice to render an adult legal
actor criminally responsible).
271. For a more extended discussion of the autonomy premise in criminal
law, see Abramowicz, supra note 145, at 843–57.
272. See Weinreb, supra note 254, at 77 (“The criminal law departs from
convention in order not to undermine the conventional basis of desert
altogether, by calling into question whether a person can ever truly be
said to have acted with freedom and responsibility despite the
determinate conditions of his existence.”); Joshua Dressler, Reflections
on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New Excuses and the Model
Penal Code, 19 Rutgers L.J. 671, 680 (1988) (noting that “science . . . is
increasingly forcing us to acknowledge the unhappy conclusion that
human behavior is caused by many factors, some inherent and others
social, over which we have no control”).
273. See Moore, supra note 259, at 1147 (“To stand back and to refuse to
judge because one understands the causes of criminal behavior . . .
betokens a refusal to acknowledge the equal moral dignity of others.”);
Stephen J. Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Criminology: A Reply to
Judge Bazelon, 49 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1247, 1267–68 (1976) (“[T]he law’s
presumption of responsibility . . . treats all persons as autonomous and
capable of that most human capacity, the capacity to choose. To treat
persons otherwise is to treat them as less than human.”).
274. See Morse, supra note 273, at 1257, 1262 (arguing that excusing
defendants on the basis that their criminal conduct was determined by
their background could lead to repressive results, such as preventive
detention, forced therapy, and an intrusive “therapeutic state”).
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necessary to provide “meaning in life” and to “construct a normative
order in a world otherwise indifferent to human norms.” 275
Underlying these arguments is a broad consensus that the
criminal law must take adult autonomy for granted and assign
liability accordingly, rather than investigate the extent to which each
adult legal actor is truly autonomous in the sense of possessing both
rational capacity and full freedom of choice. We do so because, for our
system of criminal law to function, we need to operate on the
assumption that most adult legal actors can, and should, be held
responsible for their actions. As Herbert Packer put it in his
discussion of criminal liability, “the law treats man’s conduct as
autonomous and willed, not because it is, but because it is desirable
to proceed as if it were.” 276
B.

Autonomy as Premise and as Goal in Contract Law

Autonomy is also a central concern of contract law. In criminal
law, as we saw, autonomy is relevant to whether a defendant acted
with sufficient moral agency to justify the imposition of punishment.
The stakes in contract law are not as high—the losing party to a
contract dispute faces loss of money or property, not of liberty or
life—and therefore contract law does not exhibit the same fraught
preoccupation as criminal law with precisely the degree of individual
autonomy necessary to render a person legally responsible. But
contract law, as well, depends on the assumption that the legal actors
on whom the power of the state is brought to bear acted with
sufficient autonomy to justify state action.
In contract law, autonomy functions, in somewhat circular
fashion, as both justifying premise and normative goal. The defining
feature of contract law is that it enforces agreements that have been
voluntarily entered into. Thus, in theory, contract law brings the
power of the state to bear only upon those who have deliberately
invited the state to intervene in their affairs and have themselves set
the terms of this intervention. Moreover, insofar as contractual
obligations are freely assumed, their enforcement is seen as enhancing
the autonomy of the contracting parties. The argument, in short, is
that as long as contracting parties are autonomous, enforcing their
agreements will make them more so.
Individual autonomy was especially important to classical
contract doctrine, in particular its ethos of freedom of contract, under
which courts shifted from policing the fairness of bargains to enforcing
whatever agreements the parties arranged amongst themselves. 277 As
275. Pillsbury, supra note 269, at 721.
276. Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 74–75
(1968).
277. See Atiyah, supra note 175, at 402–05.
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long as parties to a contract were autonomous adults, in the sense of
both rational and free, then freedom of contract, it was argued, would
facilitate freedom more generally. 278 The decline of classical contract
theory, and its replacement by a more regulatory approach to
contract law, was the result, in part, of criticism of autonomy as both
premise and goal of contract law. As contract scholars began to
observe the extent to which contracting parties often fall short of the
ideal of autonomous choice, it became more difficult to argue that
freedom of contract necessarily facilitates the free and rational choices
of the contracting parties. 279 At the same time, many began to argue
that contract law does, and should, promote values other than
autonomy, such as efficiency 280 or distributive justice. 281 Today,
autonomy contract theorists are outnumbered by efficiency contract
theorists, who argue, as both a normative and a descriptive matter,
that contract law functions primarily to promote the efficient
distribution of resources. 282
Nonetheless, autonomy continues to be one of the major
theoretical approaches to contract law. The most prominent
proponent of the autonomy approach to contract law is Charles Fried,
who in Contract as Promise revived the argument of classical
contract doctrine that enforcement of promises is necessary to respect
the autonomy of the promisor. 283 Fried begins by exploring the moral
basis of contractual obligation and concludes that “[t]he obligation to
keep a promise is grounded not in arguments of utility but in respect

278. See, e.g., A.V. Dicey, Lectures on the Relation Between Law
and Public Opinion in England During the Nineteenth Century
189 (1905) (attributing the “extension of individual liberty” in England
from 1825 to 1870 to “freedom of contract” principles); Maine, supra
note 174, at 169 (characterizing the rise of “Contract” as having created
“a phase of social order in which all . . . relations arise from the free
agreement of Individuals.”).
279. See Atiyah, supra note 175, at 231–37.
280. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An
Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 Yale L.J. 1261, 1263–64
(1980) (arguing for a wealth-maximizing understanding of contract law).
281. See Kronman, supra note 179, at 474 (“[R]ules of contract law should be
used to implement distributional goals whenever alternative ways of
doing so are likely to be more costly or intrusive.”).
282. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the
Philosophy of Promising, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 489, 491 (1989) (contending
that autonomy theories cannot help to determine the proper content of
default rules); see generally Trebilcock, supra note 207, at 8
(evaluating the competing claims of the autonomy approach to contracts
and the efficiency, or welfare-maximizing, approach).
283. Fried, supra note 175.
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for individual autonomy and in trust.” 284 Randy Barnett further
developed the importance of autonomy to contract law with his
consent-based theory of contracts. 285 While Barnett grounds contract
enforcement not on the morality of promising, but on the fact of
consent, his approach shares with Fried’s a concern with individual
autonomy. 286 More recently, some contracts scholars, such as Nathan
Oman and Jody Kraus, have argued for integrating the autonomy
approach with the efficiency approach to contract law. 287
Autonomy comes into play in efficiency theories of contract as
well, as premise if not as goal. Efficiency theorists argue that contract
law should seek to maximize individual welfare, and that this is often
best achieved by enforcing the free choices of the contracting parties,
which presumably reflect their values and preferences. 288 Under this
view, for contract law to achieve the goal of efficiency, the agreements
it enforces must indeed be the product of autonomous choice. 289
Contract law’s emphasis on individual autonomy is visible in the
defenses to contractual enforcement. Many of these are premised on
284 Id. at 16.
285. See Barnett, supra note 175, at 270 (“Consent is the moral component
that distinguishes valid from invalid transfer of alienable rights.”).
286. See id. at 319 (“A consent theory’s concern with the issue of individual
will and autonomy is reflected in the manner by which consent is
determined—the theory looks for a manifestation of intention to be
legally bound.”).
287. See Jody S. Kraus, Reconciling Autonomy and Efficiency in Contract
Law: The Vertical Integration Strategy, 11 Phil. Issues 420, 421–22
(2001) (explaining how efficiency and autonomy theories of contract law
can be “combined as logically distinct components of a unified theory”
by “preserving the most defensible claims, and subordinating or
abandoning the weakest claims, of each kind of theory”); Nathan B.
Oman, The Failure of Economic Interpretations of the Law of Contract
Damages, 64 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 829, 829 (2007) (arguing for a
unified approach in which autonomy determines the basic structure of
contract law and efficiency fills out the details).
288. See Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 13 (40th
anniversary ed. 2002) (asserting that a welfare-maximizing approach to
contract law requires that “the transaction is bi-laterally voluntary and
informed”); Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the
Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 Hofstra L. Rev.
487, 497 (“The system of wealth maximization consists of institutions
that facilitate, or where that is infeasible approximate, the operations of
a free market and thus maximize autonomous, utility-seeking
behavior.”).
289. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of
Contract, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 211, 212 (1995) (noting that efficiency
theory relies on “the empirical premise that in making a bargain a
contracting party will act with full cognition to rationally maximize his
subjective expected utility”).
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defects in the two components of autonomy that we discussed in the
context of criminal responsibility: volition and rational capacity. 290 In
the lack-of-volition category are excuses such as duress and undue
influence. 291 Here, contract law refuses to enforce contracts that are
the product of a power imbalance that makes the choice to enter into
the contract insufficiently voluntary. 292 Contract excuses in the lackof-rationality category include mutual mistake and impracticability. 293
The defense of mutual mistake prevents contract enforcement in
certain situations where the contracting parties lacked the information
necessary to rationally assess the benefits of entering into the
contract, whereas impracticability denies enforcement in certain
situations where a contracting party has made an inaccurate
calculation of the costs of performing as promised. 294 These defenses to
contract enforcement, then, attempt to ensure that autonomy holds
true as a premise of contract law, by refusing to enforce contracts
made by parties who lacked sufficient volition or rationality to make
an autonomous choice.
The two components of autonomy, rationality and volition, are
also behind the contractual rules of incapacity. Contracts can be
voided for lack of capacity, for instance on the basis of infancy or
mental incompetence. 295 The theory is that those who are
incapacitated for these reasons lack a sufficient degree of autonomy to
form a binding contract because they lack a fully developed ability to
make rational choices and at the same time are unusually susceptible
to pressure from others. 296 The incapacity defense is central to the
290. See discussion supra Part II.A.
291. See Farnsworth, supra note 176, §§ 4.16–4.21.
292. See Trebilcock, supra note 207, at 78–101 (discussing “the
preconditions to voluntary consent” in the case of a contractual
transaction and noting that “[t]his issue is deeply problematic, if only
because of the pervasiveness of scarcity, which renders all choices
constrained choices”).
293. See Farnsworth, supra note 176, § 9; see also Trebilcock, supra
note 207, at 103 (“[H]ow much information is required for the exercise of
autonomous choices presents a complex puzzle: it is difficult to conceive
of a choice as autonomous without basic information on its implications,
but . . . it may be rational to choose to forgo the acquisition of further
information where its expected benefits are less than its expected
costs.”).
294. See Trebilcock, supra note 207, at 127–46 (discussing mutual mistake,
impracticability, and other contract defenses related to “symmetric
information imperfections”).
295. See Farnsworth, supra note 176, §§ 4.2–4.6.
296. See Kiefer v. Fred Howe Motors, Inc., 158 N.W.2d 288, 290 (Wis. 1968)
(allowing a minor to disaffirm the purchase of an automobile under
infancy doctrine, and explaining that “the minor [i]s immature in both
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claim of contract theorists—and in particular of freedom-of-contract
proponents—that contract promotes individual autonomy by
enforcing only the choices of free and rational individuals. 297
In contract law as in criminal law, a central question is where to
draw the line in absolving adult actors of legal responsibility. In
contract law, even more than in criminal law, this debate hinges on
the conflict between autonomy as premise and autonomy as goal. The
argument on one side is that we should not hold parties responsible
for their promises where they lacked full autonomy in making them.
The argument on the other side is that refusing to enforce contracts
will diminish the individual autonomy that contract law is designed to
promote, both in an expressive sense (by treating adults like children)
and in a practical one (by making it more difficult for them to enter
into binding agreements).
Thus, autonomy is on both sides of the equation in one of the
most contested issues of contract enforcement—the doctrine of
unconscionability, which allows courts to refuse to enforce agreements
that are substantively and procedurally unfair. 298 Under the doctrine
of freedom of contract, which rose to dominance in the late nineteenth
century, courts that had formerly policed the fairness of bargains
began to see their role instead as to enforce whatever agreements the
parties had arranged amongst themselves. 299 Courts continued to be
mind and experience and . . . therefore . . . he should be protected from
his own bad judgments as well as from adults who would take
advantage of him”). See generally Farnsworth, supra note 176, §§ 4.4–
4.5 (discussing avoidance of contracts by minors).
297. See Maine, supra note 174, at 173 (asserting that children are the
exception that prove the rule that contract promotes freedom of choice,
because the rule of incapacity of infants underscores the extent to which
“the faculty of forming a judgment on [one’s] own interests” is “the first
essential of an engagement by Contract”).
298. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (“If the court as a matter of law finds the contract
or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it
was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract . . . .”); see also
Larry A. DiMatteo, Equity’s Modification of Contract: An Analysis of
the Twentieth Century’s Equitable Reformation of Contract Law, 33
New Eng. L. Rev. 265, 291–92 (1999) (“An unconscionability
determination generally revolves around a two-part formula. First, the
court asks whether there is evidence of procedural unconscionability.
Second, it considers whether the weakness in the bargaining process has
resulted in a substantively unfair contract. . . . It is unclear whether a
finding of unconscionability requires both procedural and substantive
unconscionability.”).
299. See Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net
Function, 58 Ala. L. Rev. 73, 82 (2006) (“Classical contract doctrine
did not stake its claim on contract thought until the nineteenth century.
It was then that contracts scholars began to erode prior convictions that
only fair exchanges warranted enforcement.”).
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reluctant to enforce extremely unfair bargains, however, and would on
occasion refuse enforcement on other grounds, for instance by finding
that the terms were presumptively the product of fraud or duress. 300
By the mid-twentieth century, courts began to use the doctrine of
unconscionability to strike down bargains that fell short of fraud,
duress, or incapacity in the traditional sense, but where one of the
parties agreed to unfair terms under conditions that limited the
party’s freedom of choice or rationality, such as inequality of
bargaining power, economic pressure, or lack of sophistication. 301
The application of unconscionability doctrine to police
substantively unfair bargains typically occurs in the name of
protecting historically vulnerable and oppressed groups, such as the
poor and women. The most prominent discussions of
unconscionability in recent years have concerned the protection of
disadvantaged consumers (as in Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture Co., discussed above); 302 vulnerable spouses, typically wives
(as in the debate over the enforceability of prenuptial agreements); 303
and poor women (as in the debate over surrogacy agreements). 304 The
effect of using the unconscionability doctrine in these contexts, it is
argued, is to further diminish the autonomy of these already
disadvantaged groups by characterizing them as incompetent and
300. See id. at 82–83; see also Hume v. U.S., 132 U.S. 406, 413 (1889)
(discussing cases finding terms sufficiently unfair that “fraud was
apparent upon the face of the contracts”).
301. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449
(D.C. Cir. 1965) (“Unconscionability has generally been recognized to
include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties
together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the
other party.”); see also id. (“In many cases the meaningfulness of the
choice is negated by a gross inequality of bargaining power. The manner
in which the contract was entered is also relevant to this consideration.
Did each party to the contract, considering his obvious education or
lack of it, have a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the
contract . . . ?” (footnote omitted)).
302. See supra text accompanying notes 219–24.
303. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 289, at 256–57 (describing how courts
have expanded unconscionability doctrine to encompass post-divorce
economic injustice, regardless of whether the injustice arose at the time
of contract formation, and arguing that such cases are better understood
as driven by the limits of cognition).
304. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive Theory of Contract: From
Feminist Dilemmas to a Reconceptualization of Rational Choice in
Contract Law, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1235, 1238 (1998) (discussing
how
surrogacy agreements pose “what feminist legal scholars know as the
‘dilemma of choice,’ namely, the conflict between promoting women’s
autonomy and freedom of choice on the one hand, and protecting
women from the harmful consequences of choices made under conditions
of inequality on the other”).
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overriding their decisions and preferences on the basis that they are
necessarily either irrational or coerced. 305 The argument on the other
side is that the unconscionability doctrine protects the autonomy of
women, the poor, and other disadvantaged groups by ensuring that
their contractual choices are made freely 306 and with full
information. 307
Those who argue for enforcing the contracts of surrogate mothers
or hard-pressed consumers do not insist that their promises were
necessarily made in conditions of absolute rationality and freedom of
choice. They argue, rather, that the autonomy-enhancing effects of
enforcing contractual promises are such that these groups, and society
generally, will be better off if we treat most minimally competent
adults as if they are autonomous, drawing the line only at those who
act under certain extreme limits on their autonomy, such as cognitive
incapacity, fraudulent misinformation, or duress. 308
Thus, in contract law as in criminal law, many scholars advocate
an as-if approach to autonomy and individual responsibility. Under
this approach, we treat most adult legal actors as if they are
autonomous, and hold them to their promises accordingly, without
inquiring into the degree to which this premise holds true.
C.

The Perspective of Family Law: Autonomy, Parenting,
and Child Development

Scholars within both criminal law and contract law, then, have
devoted great attention to the premise of adult autonomy; have noted
that this premise does not, in practice, always hold true; and have
engaged in an often tortured debate about the problems posed by this
305. See id. at 1248 (noting that those singled out for special treatment are
“thereby . . . identified, in the logic of contract, as less competent . . .
than the autonomous agent with whom the law ordinarily deals”); see
also id. (proposing that we address this dilemma by reconceptualizing
rational choice as expressive and thereby reconfiguring the basis of
contractual obligation).
306. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 211, at 1909–11 (describing arguments that
surrogacy agreements should be prohibited to prevent mothers from
being coerced by poverty to sell their children).
307. See, e.g., Brinig, supra note 204, at 2388 (“[S]urrogacy contracts are
suboptimal because the surrogate cannot ex ante have perfect, or even
minimally adequate, information.”).
308. See, e.g., Shultz, supra note 200, at 355 (arguing that the refusal to
enforce surrogacy contracts on the basis that they are not voluntary
treats women “as non-autonomous persons”); cf. Radin, supra note 211,
at 1915-16 (discussing the dilemma of the “double bind,” under which
commodification exacerbates the oppression of women by devaluing
their personhood, but disallowing commodification prevents women from
taking steps that they believe are preferable to remaining in their
impoverished circumstances).
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disjunction to each field’s legitimacy. At the same time, criminal law
theorists have struggled to develop a coherent rationale for taking
children’s interests into account in cases involving their parents, with
many concluding that to do so would undermine the goals and
legitimacy of criminal law. And contract theorists have confronted the
issue of children’s interests as well, albeit only in the limited domain
of familial contracts. Yet no scholar from either criminal or contract
law has thought to link the premise of adult autonomy with the
problem of how to treat children in cases where they are affected
indirectly.
When the premise of adult autonomy is considered from the
perspective of family law, the connection between these two
problems—the premise of autonomy when it comes to adults and the
question of how to treat children in cases involving their parents—
becomes clear. As we saw in Part I, family law tells us that subtle
differences in the ways children are raised can have profound effects
on the extent of autonomy that children are able to exercise upon
reaching adulthood. Family law looks, in particular, to how the
variables of each parent’s environment, and of each parent’s
continued contact with, or separation from, his or her child, can either
facilitate or hinder the cognitive, emotional, educational, and social
developments crucial to each child’s future ability to make free,
rational choices as an independent adult.
We have also seen, in Part II, the extent to which these
determinants of children’s future autonomy can be shaped by the
resolution of criminal or contracts cases involving parents. The
connection between the legal treatment of parents and the
developmental trajectory of their children is most stark in cases
involving parental incarceration, which in most instances separates
parents from their children. As we saw in our discussion of family
law’s best-interests assessment, many courts consider separation of
child from parent as inflicting particularly profound harm on a child’s
intellectual and emotional development, with potentially devastating
effects on a child’s adult self. Family law attempts, accordingly, to
avoid separations of this nature whenever possible, in the name of
protecting children’s development and future potential.
The potential effect on children of contracts involving their
parents is typically less devastating than that of parental incarceration, particularly with respect to ordinary commercial or consumer
contracts that do not restructure family ties. Nonetheless, from the
perspective of family law’s best-interests analysis, we can see that
even non-familial contract disputes by parents can adversely affect
their children’s development in ways that may diminish their future
autonomy. Family-law jurisprudence acknowledges that children’s
development may well be hindered, both educationally and emotionally,
by the financial distress of their families. The impairment of children’s
development is particularly severe when the financial distress entails
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disruption of the child’s environment and diminishment of the
parent’s own well-being and ability to function, as is often the case,
for instance, when a parent is forced into bankruptcy or foreclosure.
We have largely marginalized our attention to the effect of legal
decision making on children’s development within the specialized field
of family law. The marginalization of children’s interests within family
law works to blind us to the contradiction between our treatment of
children across various non-family-law fields of the legal canon and
our assumptions in these fields regarding adults. As long as we allow
this contradiction to stand unaddressed, it will continue to undermine
the legitimacy of any area of law that, like both contract law and
criminal law, treats most minimally competent adults as autonomous
and assigns liability on that basis.
D.

Taking Children’s Interests into Account in Cases Involving
Their Parents

Both criminal law and contract law treat most adult legal actors
as if they are autonomous, even in many situations where they are
not. 309 A primary argument for this as-if approach to adult autonomy
is that it would be paternalistic to treat adults as less than fully
capable. Paternalism, it is argued, is inappropriate when it comes to
the treatment of adults. It diminishes their autonomy both
practically, by overriding their decisions, and expressively, by
conveying that they are either irrational or lacking in volition.
The anti-paternalism argument, however, does not have the same
power when it comes to the protection of children. Children, it is
widely agreed, are neither as rational nor as free as adults, and thus
require protection in many situations where adults do not. It is for
this reason that we treat children differently from adults in cases
involving them directly. Children are not liable for crimes in many
instances where an adult would be, because they lack the requisite
cognitive ability and freedom of choice to merit criminal
responsibility. 310 Similarly, children are not bound by their promises
to the same extent that adults are, because they lack the cognitive
and volitional capacity to give proper contractual consent. 311
The law thus recognizes that children lack the autonomy of adults
and often exempts them from liability accordingly. But there is little
discussion, outside of family law, of the interaction between legal
decision making, child development, and the degree of autonomy that
309. See supra Part II.A–B.
310. But see Cynthia V. Ward, Punishing Children in the Criminal Law, 82
Notre Dame L. Rev. 429, 429–42 (2006) (discussing recent trend
toward treating children as adults when charged with particularly
serious offenses, and noting the scholarly opposition to this trend).
311. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
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a child will exercise upon becoming an adult. And children’s future
autonomy is almost never discussed in connection with cases that
affect them indirectly, by affecting their parents or caretakers. Yet, as
we have seen, cases that affect children’s parents, whether by
incarcerating them or by changing their financial fortunes, will often
affect children themselves. 312 And the effect on children of such cases
is often to impede their development in ways that will limit the
degree of autonomy they will exercise upon reaching adulthood.
The perspective of the autonomy premise turns on its head the
prevailing arguments against taking children’s interests into account
in cases involving their parents in the area of criminal law, and shows
the blind spot of scholars in other areas of law who fail to address the
issue at all. The very same rationales that militate against treating
adults as less than fully responsible for their actions—that adults are
best treated as if they are autonomous—argue in favor of protecting
children. Children not only lack autonomy, but are engaged in a
developmental process that will determine the extent of autonomy
they enjoy in the future. Children who are adversely affected by a
criminal or a contract case involving their parents bear no
responsibility for the situation they find themselves in. Despite this,
they may well find their future autonomy diminished as a result of
the legal action taken against their parents. If the law is going to
treat children as autonomous upon reaching adulthood, it must also
recognize its own role in shaping the conditions in which children are
raised, and thus influencing—and perhaps diminishing—the likelihood
that the children will become free and rational adults who deserve to
be held responsible for their actions.

IV. Model for Assessing When to Take
Children’s Interests into Account
A.

Introduction

This Article has established that taking children’s interests into
account will improve the consistency and legitimacy of areas of law
that are premised on a model of the autonomous adult legal actor. By
attending to the ways in which legal decisions might harm a child’s
future autonomy, areas of law that take adult autonomy for granted
will contribute to their legitimacy by making it more likely—or at
least not making it less likely—that this premise will hold true.
That there is good reason to attend to children’s future
autonomy, however, does not mean that it necessarily makes sense for
the law to do so in every case, or at the expense of countervailing
considerations. To protect children’s future autonomy at all costs

312. See supra Part II.A.1, B.1.
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would undermine the goals of most areas of law, including the goal of
promoting autonomy.
Where, then, do we draw the line? There is already extensive
discussion of where to draw the line in cases involving children
directly, such as those where a child is charged with a crime. 313 At the
other end of the spectrum, this Article will leave for future discussions
whether and how to take children’s interests into account in every
legal case that might affect them in some way. Instead, this Article
narrows its inquiry to a distinct subset of cases that affect children
indirectly—those involving children’s parents—and assesses whether
and to what extent it makes sense to take children’s interests into
account in such cases.
This Article will conclude by presenting a general model for
assessing both when and how to take children’s interests into account
in cases involving their parents. The model is intended to be
applicable to any area of law in which children are potentially affected
by such cases. It entails three steps, which together provide a
mechanism for determining whether it makes sense to take children’s
interests into account in a given area of law, and, if so, how and to
what extent those interests should be considered and balanced against
competing concerns. The proposed model addresses several potential
objections to taking children’s interests into account, including
unfairness, counterproductiveness, and inefficiency.
B.

When to Take Children’s Interests into Account
1.

Step One: Evaluating Premises and Goals

In determining whether to take children’s interests into account in
a given area of law, we must first consider the extent to which the
conditions of child development bear upon the premises and goals of
that area of law. Where children may be affected by cases involving
their parents in ways that have bearing upon the assumptions that a
given area of law will apply to the children as adults, we have
sufficient reason to proceed with our analysis and to consider taking
children’s interests into account.
The two areas of law we have examined, criminal law and
contract law, are both premised on an assumption of adult
autonomy. 314 As we have seen, both criminal and contract law treat
minimally competent adults as autonomous and assign liability on
that basis, even where a legal actor is, in reality, less than fully
autonomous. We have seen, as well, that both criminal and contract
cases involving parents can affect children’s development in ways that
will either facilitate or hinder children’s future capacity for
313. See, e.g., Ward, supra note 310, at 430.
314. See supra Parts III.A–B.
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autonomy. 315 Thus, taking children’s interests into account in such
cases can be viewed as enhancing the legitimacy of both fields by
making the autonomy presumption more of a reality. Similarly,
consideration of children’s interests would be merited in any other
area of law that takes adult autonomy for granted.
While this Article has focused on the premise of adult autonomy,
there may also be a strong rationale for taking children’s interests
into account in fields that do not share this premise. To begin with,
even where a given field does not presume that adults are
autonomous, the fact of adult autonomy may well contribute, on an
instrumental level, to achieving the goals of that area of law.
Consider, for instance, the deterrence rationale of criminal law. In
order to effectively deter the population from committing crimes,
criminal law requires that each legal actor have the capacity for
deliberative, rational thought that will lead to weighing the benefits of
committing any given offense against the costs of being caught and
punished. 316 A child who is brought up in a way that enhances her
potential for autonomous, rational choice will be more likely to be
deterred from committing crime than one who was not. From this
perspective, promoting children’s future autonomy can be seen as
enhancing the effectiveness of any area of law that hopes to achieve
its goals through deterrence, or through any other mechanism of
reasoned thought on the part of the adult population that is subject
to its rule.
Additionally, the family-law best-interests jurisprudence this
Article examined in Part I makes clear that the conditions of child
development have bearing not just upon adult autonomy, but upon
many other aspects of adult capacity as well. Family law tells us that
how children are raised potentially affects every facet of their adult
selves, from intellectual capacity, emotional regulation, and educational attainments to productivity and sense of ethics. 317 Thus, to
determine the wisdom of taking children’s interests into account in a
particular legal field, we should think broadly about the ways in
which children’s adult capacities are potentially affected by cases
involving their parents within that field, and about how these
capacities may be linked to the goals and the premises of that
doctrinal area of law.
315. See supra Part II.
316. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence
in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing
Its Best, 91 Geo. L.J. 949, 950–51 (2003) (contending that criminal
law’s deterrent effect ceases to function properly when its fundamental
assumptions—an actor’s knowledge of the law and ability to perform a
rational cost-benefit analysis—are absent).
317. See supra Part I.A.3.b.
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In determining whether to take children’s interests into account in
cases involving their parents within a given area of law, then, our first
step will be to determine whether there is a potential rationale within
that field for attending to children’s interests. This rationale will
likely take the form of recognizing the ways in which child
development can affect a type of adult capacity that has bearing upon
the premises or goals of the given doctrinal field. Should we find such
a rationale, however, this does not end our inquiry, but merely brings
us to the second step of our analysis, which reflects the recognition
that there may well be reasons to refrain from considering children’s
interests despite having identified a potential rationale for doing so.
2.

Step Two: The Nature of the Parties

The second step of the model entails determining whether the
case at hand involves state action against individuals, or whether it
instead involves litigation between private parties. This Section will
both explain and demonstrate this aspect of the proposed mechanism
for assessing when to take children’s interests into account in cases
involving their parents.
a.

State Action Against Individuals

Taking children’s interests into account in cases involving their
parents is most feasible and most advisable where one of the parties is
the state and the other is a private individual. The paradigmatic legal
confrontation between an individual and the state occurs in criminal
law. Criminal law involves state action at its most forceful and
coercive, in that the state initiates the prosecution against the
criminal defendant, and it often does so with the aim of curtailing the
defendant’s freedom, and sometimes his or her life. By examining
what it would look like to take children’s interests into account when
sentencing their parents, we can think more generally about the
advantages and disadvantages of taking children’s interests into
account in other litigation involving state actions against individuals
who happen to be parents.
The state, unlike a private litigant, has an obligation to ensure
that children are raised in conditions that will enhance, rather than
diminish, their future autonomy. This obligation exists, at least in
part, because the state has established a coercive system of law that
will hold most children accountable for their actions upon entering
adulthood, on the premise that those children have become
autonomous legal actors who bear responsibility for what they do. 318
A further basis for the state’s obligation to attend to children’s
conditions of development is that the state delegates parental rights
to private families and backs these rights with the force of law.
318. See supra Part III.A.
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Children themselves bear no responsibility for the conditions of their
upbringing, because these conditions are necessarily involuntary—
children cannot choose their parents. Parents, of course, do bear
responsibility for their children, but this does not negate the
simultaneous responsibility of the state. Since the state arranges and
enforces our current system of parent-child relationships, and will
treat children as autonomous, and hold them responsible for their
actions accordingly, when they become adults, the state bears a
corresponding obligation to consider children’s future autonomy when
taking action against their parents. 319
Cases where the state is a party, moreover, are especially likely to
disrupt children’s lives. Disputes between private individuals that do
not involve matters of family law or children typically involve
monetary damages or other property rights. While the outcome of
even ordinary commercial disputes involving a parent may affect a
child’s upbringing, 320 in many instances such disputes will have little
or no effect on the child at all. A criminal case against a parent, on
the other hand, is likely to have a significant adverse effect on his or
her child, especially where the parent faces incarceration. When the
state incarcerates an involved parent, it actively reshapes a child’s
family in ways that can have profound effects on the child’s future
autonomy and well-being. 321 Thus, it makes sense to single out cases
involving potentially coercive state actions as ones in which children’s
interests should be considered.
Finally, the state is well-positioned to take on the costs and
burdens of protecting children’s interests. As the next Section
addresses, imposing the costs of other people’s children on private
litigants may in many cases be both unfair and inefficient. But the
state is large enough to bear those costs effectively, and thus to
respond to children’s interests without creating the sorts of
inefficiency and counterproductiveness that can occur when the
burden of children’s interests falls instead on private individuals and
corporations.
b.

Litigation Between Private Parties

Generally. Taking children’s interests into account in cases that
affect them only indirectly is significantly more problematic in
319. Linda McClain and Anne Dailey have each made the related argument
that the state should attend to child development because doing so
fosters the traits of autonomy and rational capacity that are a
precondition of democratic citizenship and are necessary to engage in
deliberative democracy. See McClain, supra note 11; Dailey, supra note
11.
320. See supra Part II.B.1.
321. See supra Parts II.A.1, IV.B.1.b.
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litigation between private parties, such as tort actions, property
disputes, and contract law. Insofar as an area of private law assumes
adults to be autonomous, taking children’s interests into account in
cases that affect them indirectly would help, in the short term, to
make this premise more of a reality by promoting each such child’s
future autonomy. But, as we can see by examining how this approach
would play out in contract law, taking children’s interests into
account in such cases would often be counterproductive. In ordinary
commercial or consumer contract disputes involving children’s
parents, for instance, case-by-case consideration of children’s interests
would undermine many of the goals of contract law, such as
autonomy, efficiency, and predictability. It would also, in the long
run, undermine our very goal in attending to children’s interests in
the first instance: the facilitation of conditions of child development
most likely to produce autonomous adults.
Take, for example, the contract this Article discussed at the
outset: a distributorship agreement giving a parent exclusive rights to
market a certain brand of shoes in a geographical area. 322 After five
years, the shoe manufacturer decides to end the exclusive agreement,
which in turn will force the parent out of business. The contract is
silent about termination, and a court must determine whether the
manufacturer has a right to terminate the agreement. Should the
court take into account the effect of its decision on the parent’s two
young children?
Regardless of the harm the children might suffer, taking their
interests into account in an ordinary commercial dispute of this
nature would be both inefficient and unfair. It would distort the
ordinary mechanisms of the market to burden a business owner with
the costs of children simply because he happens to conduct business
with a parent. To interpret a distributorship agreement differently
when one of the parties is a parent would give some manufacturers a
competitive advantage over others simply because they did not have
the misfortune to sell to a parent who becomes financially vulnerable.
The result, in an extreme case, could be to put out of business the
manufacturer who produces better products at more competitive
prices, for reasons entirely unrelated to the shoe-manufacturing
industry. This is not only an inefficient method of weeding out
businesses but also unfair to the manufacturer and its employees.
Allowing contract enforcement to hinge on parental status would
also, in the long run, diminish the autonomy of parents themselves,
thus impeding their ability to provide their children with optimal
conditions of development. Were parents to potentially escape
contractual liability whenever their children’s interests were at stake,
parents would become less appealing as contractual partners.
322. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
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Businesses would be less likely to enter into agreements with parties
who have children, both in a commercial setting and in a consumer
one. The result would be to disempower parents by making it more
difficult for them to form binding agreements and thus to enter into
employment, obtain credit, or purchase goods. 323
The difficulty here is comparable to the one addressed by this
Article’s discussion of unconscionability doctrine. 324 Absolving a
certain group of responsibility for their contractual obligations—
whether it is parents or poor consumers—will make it more difficult
for members of that group to take advantage of the benefits of
contract law, such as enhancing autonomy and maximizing wealth.
Just as Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. was criticized for
potentially making it more difficult for inner-city residents to
purchase goods on credit, differential treatment of contracts entered
into by parents could have the same effect. 325 It might be possible to
address this problem through regulation that prohibits discrimination
on the basis of parental status. But such regulation would be difficult
to enforce, insofar as discrimination in choosing contractual partners
is often difficult to prove. Thus, extending special protection to
parents on a case-by-case basis could backfire, in ways that could
ultimately diminish, rather than enhance, children’s future autonomy.
For these reasons, it is generally not advisable to take children’s
interests into account in private litigation that has no direct bearing
on the children but affects them indirectly through their parents.
Despite the good reasons for helping individual children, attending to
their interests in such cases would impose the costs of doing so on
private parties who have no reason to bear those costs, instead of
distributing them across society more generally. This uneven and
unpredictable distribution of costs on an unlucky few could, in turn,
distort the goals of the doctrinal area of law at hand. In the contract
context, for instance, attending to children’s interests in such cases
would undermine the goals of contract law by creating inefficient and
autonomy-reducing outcomes.
Systemic Effect on Children. The analysis of whether to take
children’s interests into account changes, however, in areas of private
323. Moreover, if we were to take into account children’s interests at the
time of contract enforcement, even those who seem like they might
become parents down the road could seem like risky contractual
partners, creating an even larger category of those who would be
potentially disempowered.
324. See discussion supra Part III.B.
325. See Eben Colby, Note, What Did the Doctrine of Unconscionability Do
to the Walker-Thomas Furniture Company?, 34 Conn. L. Rev. 625,
658 (2002) (contending that the furniture company responded to the
decision by making it more difficult for poor consumers to obtain
credit).
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law where children’s interests tend to be systemically—even if
indirectly, and not inevitably—at stake. Consider, for instance, cases
related to residential housing, such as those involving real estate
contracts, leases, and mortgage agreements. More than a third of all
households include at least one child under the age of eighteen. 326 A
legal dispute involving a home, then, has a fair chance of indirectly
affecting a child to some degree. Other situations where a child is
likely to be significantly affected by a private dispute involving a
parent include personal bankruptcy proceedings, which can determine
whether a parent will be able to support his or her family, and, for
the same reason, certain types of employment disputes.
Where we can isolate a subset of private law that is systemically
likely to have a significant effect on children, it makes sense to think
more carefully about whether to take children’s interests into account
in cases involving their parents. Even here, however, taking children’s
interests into account on a case-by-case basis—for instance, treating a
foreclosure case differently when it involves a home where a child
resides—would replicate the problems described in the preceding
Section. To allow the outcome of any given case to hinge on the
presence of children would inefficiently and unfairly burden whichever
private actors happen to do business with parents. This burden, in
turn, could make it more difficult for parents to enter into agreements
in the first instance.
But a case-by-case approach to children’s interests is not the only
possible approach where children’s interests are systemically at stake.
Here, rather than single out parents for special treatment, we can
instead create across-the-board rules that will tend to protect children
but will apply regardless of whether children are present in a
particular case. For example, since children tend to live in family
homes, we can create special rules that protect both the tenants and
the purchasers of residential homes. This approach would still raise
the problem of fairness, in that it would distribute the cost of
attending to children’s interests to a particular group or industry,
such as landlords or banks. But it would eliminate some of the
inefficiency concerns that we saw in a case-by-case approach, in that
all members of the industry—for instance, all landlords—would be
subject to the same costs, and therefore none would suffer a
competitive disadvantage. And an across-the-board approach would
protect children’s interests without creating a situation in which
parents are discriminated against by those who fear that their
agreements will not be enforced.
326. See Rose M. Kreider & Diana B. Elliott, U.S. Census Bureau,
America’s Families and Living Arrangements: 2007, at 3 tbl.1
(2009), available at https://www.census.gov/prod/2009pubs/p20-561.pdf
(showing that 38,052,163 out of 112,377,977 households had at least one
child under the age of eighteen).
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a.

Step Three: Balancing Children’s Interests Against Competing
Concerns
State Action Against Individuals—Case-by-Case Approach

If we are to take children’s interests into account in cases
involving state action against their parents, how should this be
accomplished? The proposal this Article makes is a modest one. The
Article does not suggest that children’s interests should trump all
other considerations, or even that they should play a role in every
case where they are at stake. To treat children’s interests as
paramount outside the context of family law would render other areas
of law unworkable. The goals of the relevant area of law must be
given weight as well.
What this Article suggests, rather, is that in a case where the
state takes coercive action against a child’s parent, courts should
consider how this will affect the child’s course of development and
should be given the discretion to take the child’s interests into
account accordingly. Where a decision will inflict significant harm on
the child’s development, such that it will likely diminish the child’s
eventual autonomy, the court should articulate this risk and balance
it against all other relevant considerations before making a final
determination. This balancing does not mean that the state should
refrain from acting whenever a child will be harmed in the process. It
means, rather, that where the state takes actions such as separating
child from parent for a significant period of time, it should understand
itself to be actively reshaping a child’s life and should do so only after
determining that this is for the best, all things considered.
One practical difficulty with this proposal is that a court without
experience in family law may not be well equipped to articulate the
effect of a decision on a child’s development. It is outside the scope of
this Article to provide the definitive solution to this problem, but
there are a number of possibilities. One is that the court could
appoint a guardian ad litem, akin to those appointed in the familylaw context, in certain types of cases where children’s interests are
significantly at stake, such as those involving the possibility of
parental incarceration. The guardian could submit a report for the
court’s consideration about the likely effect of potential outcomes on
those children, and in developing this report the guardian could
perhaps enlist the participation of expert witnesses such as those that
currently testify in child custody cases.
Another possibility, in the criminal law context, is that the
corrections officials who write presentence reports can include in these
an assessment of how the defendant’s children are likely to be affected
by various sentencing alternatives. 327 In 2009, San Francisco’s
327. See The Osborne Ass’n, A Call to Action: Safeguarding New
York’s Children of Incarcerated Parents 25 (2011), available at
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Department of Probation began to take just such an approach by
incorporating “family impact statements” into the presentence
investigation reports that the department submits to sentencing
courts. These statements describe each defendant’s caretaking
responsibilities and assess the impact of various sentencing
possibilities on the defendant’s minor children. 328 The Osborne
Association, a criminal justice advocacy group, has recommended the
widespread adoption of family impact statements at sentencing and
suggested that such reports be supplemented by defense attorneys or
other advocates to ensure that sentencing judges, along with
corrections officials, are aware of how defendants’ minor children are
likely to be affected by their parents’ incarceration. 329
Even more problematic than how to make courts aware of
children’s interests in cases involving their parents is how courts
should balance children’s interests against other considerations, such
as deterring crime. It is true, as opponents of considering children’s
interests have observed, that any differential treatment of parents,
however structured, may increase the likelihood that parents will
commit crimes. 330 But in criminal law as in other areas of law,
considerations of legitimacy often outweigh, and can also be deeply
related to, pragmatic concerns such as the reduction of crime. It is for
this reason that we do not punish the innocent, even if this might
help to deter crime in the short run. 331 Moreover, even insofar as our
goal in imposing criminal punishment is simply the instrumental one
of reducing crime, taking children’s interests into account may well
promote that goal by reducing the likelihood that they commit crimes
themselves. 332 This Article argues that the benefits of protecting
children’s future autonomy—and, more generally, of considering the
http://www.osborneny.org/NYCIP/ACalltoActionNYCIP.Osborne2011.
pdf (recommending that presentence investigation reports give greater
attention to how children are likely to be affected by a parent’s
incarceration and that courts take this information into account at
sentencing).
328. See The Osborne Ass’n, Family Impact Statements: Considering
the
Needs
of
Children
2
(2012),
available
at
http://www.osborneny.org/images/uploads/printMedia/FamilyImpactSt
atementFactSheet_Osborne.pdf.
329. See id. Other jurisdictions that have begun using family impact
statements in a limited number of cases involving potential parental
incarceration include Arkansas and Tennessee. See id.; see also Steve
Christian, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Children
of Incarcerated Parents 8 (2009).
330. See discussion supra note 169 and accompanying text.
331. On the importance of legitimacy to the deterrent effect of the criminal
law, see discussion supra Part III.A.
332. See discussion supra notes 154–59 and accompanying text.
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connection between children’s interests and the goals and premises of
the relevant area of law—are sufficient to merit at least considering
how children are affected by coercive state action against their
parents, and balancing this against competing concerns, even though
doing so will necessarily have some counterproductive incentive
effects.
The hope of this Article is that articulating the effect of legal
decision making on children’s development will encourage more
innovative thinking about how to reconcile children’s interests with
competing and equally significant policy goals. In the parental
incarceration context, for instance, there may be ways of achieving
the usual goals of criminal law—namely, deterrence, retribution,
rehabilitation, and incapacitation—while also avoiding the infliction of
harm on a developing child. One possibility, in cases involving
nonviolent first-time offenders, would be to defer the parent’s
incarceration to an extent that would minimize harm to the child, for
instance by waiting until the child has reached a developmental stage
where the separation will be less damaging. 333 Another would be to
consider alternatives to incarceration, such as fines and community
service. 334 While these and other child-protective approaches to
333. Deferring a sentence of incarceration to protect a child’s interests, while
unusual, is not unheard of. Thus, in what Myrna Raeder has described
as one of “those rare instances when sentencing takes the impact [on]
children into account,” the court sentencing two of the married Enron
defendants, Andrew and Lea Fastow, agreed to stagger their sentences
in order to ensure that their children would not be left without a parent
to care for them. See Myrna S. Raeder, Special Issue: Making a Better
World for Children of Incarcerated Parents, 50 Fam. Ct. Rev. 23, 25
& 32 n.33 (2012). It is a hope of this Article that making this sort of
solicitude for children’s interests routine will help to ameliorate the
racial and socioeconomic injustice of the current approach, where
consideration of children’s interests seems especially likely to occur in
cases involving privileged white-collar defendants such as the Fastows.
334. By bringing greater attention to the harms inflicted on children by
parental incarceration, judicial consideration of children’s interests in
such cases might also encourage non-judicial actors, such as legislatures
and prison administrators, to develop better institutional mechanisms
for protecting children whose parents are incarcerated. These could
include changing prison policies to better facilitate parent-child contact,
see Chesa Boudin, Trevor Stutz, & Aaron Littman, Prison Visitation
Policies: A Fifty State Survey (Nov. 5, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2171412 (surveying
prison visitation policies in the fifty states and describing how a number
of these impede parent-child contact); taking family ties into
consideration when deciding where to locate prisons, see Markel et
al., supra note 3, at 55 (“If prisons are built in remote rural areas, or if
prisoners are sent to prisons far from their families, then it will be
harder for the families of most prisoners to visit.”); and expanding
programs such as prison nurseries that permit incarcerated mothers who
meet certain criteria to reside with their children, see Joseph R. Carlson,
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parental incarceration have been criticized as undermining the fairness
and legitimacy of criminal law, 335 from the perspective of protecting
children’s future autonomy, they can be seen, instead, as enhancing
the legitimacy of criminal law, or of any area of law that treats adults
as if they are autonomous.
b.

Litigation Between Private Parties—Systemic Approach

In most instances of litigation between private parties, children’s
interests should not be considered in cases that affect them only
indirectly, for the reasons set forth in the preceding Section. 336 The
one subset of private litigation where the indirect effect on children
should play a role is where cases tend to affect children systemically
and in a significant way, as in foreclosure proceedings and other
litigation involving eviction from family homes. Here, for the reasons
explained above, 337 children’s interests should be taken into account
not on a case-by-case basis, but through presumptions and rules that
protect children but apply across the board.
This proposal, in fact, is consistent with much of what we already
do, although it is not always framed as such. Take, for instance, the
warranty of habitability, which is implied by law into every lease of
residential property. 338 The warranty of habitability requires that
every residence meet a certain minimum standard of safety and
livability. 339 This warranty extends protection from dangerous
conditions to a large class of children, namely, all children who live in
rented homes. While early case law on the warranty of habitability
sometimes mentions the protection of children as a rationale for
imposing the warranty, 340 the rule does not single out children for
Jr., Prison Nurseries: A Pathway to Crime-Free Futures, 34
Corrections Compendium, Spring 2009, at 17, 18–19 (2009) (noting
that, as of 2009, nine states offered either prison nursery programs or
residential treatment centers for incarcerated mothers, and two more
were considering similar programs).
335. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
336. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.b.
337. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.b.
338. 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 447 (2006).
339. Id.
340. See, e.g., P.H. Inv. v. Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Utah 1991) (noting
that tenant “with little or no resources or income, with seven children,
and pregnant” is “typical of the individuals we sought to protect by
adopting the warranty of habitability”); Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d
202, 206 (Vt. 1984) (mentioning danger to tenant’s child and
grandchild, including possibility “that her two year old child might cut
herself on the shards of glass” from a broken window, in holding that a
warranty of habitability is implied in every lease concerning a residential
dwelling unit).
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protection, and extends to childless homes as well. We thus have an
across-the-board rule that tends toward the protection of children,
without requiring that tenants with children be accorded special
treatment.
Children’s interests are arguably also behind our current acrossthe-board rules governing foreclosure law—witness the repeated
reference to children and “families” in recent debates on the subject. 341
The protection of children from extreme deprivation may well be
behind bankruptcy law as well. While there is little direct discussion
of how children’s interests are at stake in the bankruptcy context, it
is often claimed that one of the traditional goals of bankruptcy is to
enable the breadwinner to support his or her dependents, many of
whom are typically children. 342
Because the discussion of children’s interests in these contexts is
typically oblique, there is little explicit assessment of whether and
why children’s interests should factor into legal decisionmaking. We
should make explicit the extent to which the protection of children’s
interests might drive some of the generally applicable rules that we
already do apply in various areas of law, as well consider creating new
rules to achieve this same goal.
Even when we decide to protect children through a rule that
applies across the board, instead of on a case-by-case basis, the
question of whether to impose a child-protective rule in the first
instance will necessarily be a matter of extensive debate. In the
housing context, for instance, many vigorously oppose across-theboard rules, such as rent control and the warranty of habitability,
that shift burdens from tenants to landlords. These rules are criticized
as unfair redistributions of wealth, and some claim that they are
inefficient and harm both tenants and landlords by artificially
distorting the housing market. 343 It is not within the scope of this
Article to resolve that debate here. The goal, rather, is to add to the
debate a consideration of children’s interests, and of the ways in
which one or another rule will affect the likelihood that children will
develop into autonomous adults capable of making free, rational, and
efficiency-enhancing decisions of their own.

341. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
342. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
343. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 206, at 445–48 (arguing that housing code
enforcement disadvantages landlords and tenants alike by driving up
landlords’ maintenance costs and reducing the supply of low-income
housing).
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Conclusion
Family-law scholars are currently engaged in challenging family
law’s exceptional status. One aspect of this challenge has been a call
to expand the boundaries of family law by importing the tools and
insights of other fields. This Article argues that the process of
doctrinal influence should go both ways: Scholars across the legal
canon should be encouraged to consider how family law’s insights
relate to discussions and debates within their respective fields.
The Article has begun this project by demonstrating the relevance
of children’s interests in cases involving their parents—an issue today
either largely overlooked or too easily dismissed—to seemingly
unrelated debates within criminal law and contract law. Consideration
of children’s interests, and of why and how childhood matters, is
largely cabined within the exceptional realm of family law. Yet, as
this Article has shown, children’s development can be affected, often
profoundly, by cases involving their parents across a number of
doctrinal fields. These effects, in turn, have bearing on the likelihood
that children will become what each of these fields will later presume
them to be: an adult legal subject who is autonomous, in the sense of
both rational and free, and as such can be held responsible for his or
her actions and decisions.
The perspective of family law thus brings out a previously
unrecognized connection between how a doctrinal area of law treats
children and the assumptions that will be applied to each child upon
reaching adulthood. The Article argues that if an area of law, such as
criminal law or contracts, is to treat adults as if they are autonomous
and to hold them responsible accordingly, then it has a corresponding
obligation to consider taking into account the ways in which legal
decision making affects children’s future autonomy, or any other
relevant aspects of adult capacity.
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